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I. Introduction
Administrative law often suffers from its nomenclature. Because agency
action can be roughly analogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforce-
ment, the tendency has been to force into agency procedures the features
found by the "real" adjudicators, legislators, and prosecutors, namely, courts,
legislatures, and prosecutors. But there has always been an aversion to
equating agency action completely with the action of its constitutionally-
recognized cousin because of crucial differences between the two. Thus, for
example, when agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as
"quasi-legislative,"1 in reaction to the fact that regulations in most respects
look like legislation, but would flatly violate the Constitution if courts said
so.2 Similarly, the Administrative Procedure Act labels as 'Judges" many
agency personnel who initially impose agency policy on individual parties'
even though they lack the institutional independence and tenure and salary
protections that have come to be seen as the defining characteristics of federal
'Judges."4
The confusion resulting from this imprecise pigeonholing is nowhere
more pronounced than in the area of agency adjudication. Because adminis-
trative law labels the two means of agency coercion "rulemaking" and "adjudi-
cation,"' the natural inclination has been to view agency adjudication as
analogous tojudicial law-interpreting. This analogy is inaccurate in important
1. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,953 n.16 (1983).
2. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1 (vesting "all legislative powers herein granted" in Con-
gress).
3. See Pub. L. No. 95-251 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994)) (changing title
of "hearing examiners" to "administrative law judges").
4. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I (granting life tenure and salary protections to federal
judges).
5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (defining "rules" and adjudicative "orders" for pur-
poses of APA); id. § 553 (setting forth procedures for administrative "rulemaking"); id. § 554
(setting forth procedures for administrative "adjudications").
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ways. Most significantly, courts normally purport only to apply existing law,
while federal agencies are explicitly understood to have the power to make
law in the course of deciding cases. Of course, this distinction can be over-
stated. Clearly, when a court interprets tort law, or the Clean Air Act, or the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, it does not engage in a mechanical
process of plugging a pre-existing meaning into a given set of facts, with no
consideration of policy implications. But the judicial process still is con-
strained by the pre-existing law: prior precedent in the common-law context,6
the text and other interpretive clues in the statutory context,7 and a combina-
tion of those sources (and other limiting factors) in the constitutional context!
By contrast, when agencies adjudicate they enjoy more or less free rein to
adopt what they consider to be the best rule (as long, of course, as that rule is
consistent with the statute?).
6. See generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of
Administrative Law, 72 CHL-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
7. Indeed, in the last decade judges and commentators have begun debating whether the
text of a statute should serve not just as the starting point, but as the stopping point as well, in
interpreting statutes. The literature on this school of thought - descriptive and evaluative - is
extensive. For a description of textualism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism:
The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509 (1998). For a representative list of academic
critiques of textualism, see id. at 1512 n.10; for a list of defenders, see id. at 1512 n.13.
8. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan stated:
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a back-
ground of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and
historically developed. Though we exercise limited and sharply restrained judg-
ment, yet there is no "mechanical yard-stick," no "mechanical answer." The
decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely
on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take "its place in
relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come."
Id. (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,147 (1954) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting)).
9. This limitation - that an agency's adjudicatory rule must be consistent with the
underlying statute - is a different sort of limitation than that faced by a court seeking to interpret
that statute. In most cases, the court seeks to discover the statute's meaning. A court may note
the beneficial policy effects of a particular interpretation, but use those arguments only as part
of an interpretive search. Thus, for example, a court may assume that the legislature intended
a reasonable result, or a result that fully effectuates the statute's purposes, and thus use policy
arguments to support its conclusion that it in fact has interpreted the statute correctly. By
contrast, a rule emerging from an agency adjudication may well represent the agency's conclu-
sion that the statute does not answer the precise question at hand, and thus implicitly delegates
to it the power to make policy. See generally Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (concluding that vaguely-worded statutes constitute this sort of
delegation to agencies authorized to implement them). The agency's rule must still be consis-
tent with whatever guidance the statute does provide, but quite often the statute leaves the
agency with an enormous amount of discretion to choose one policy or another. Of course,
sometimes courts must also decide cases where the statute is so vague as realistically to leave
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The existence of this policy-making power under the rubric of "adjudica-
tion" has caused concern among courts. In particular, courts have wondered
whether policy-making is an appropriate function for an agency adjudicator,
given the traditional conception of adjudication as the application of existing
law to a dispute between two parties. Judicial concern increases when courts
realize that most agencies also have the power to promulgate rules,"° which,
given their resemblance to legislation, intuitively seem the more appropriate
vehicle for policy-making. If it is questionable whether explicit and sole
reliance on policy concerns can justify adjudication, and if another agency
procedure can effectively set policy, then why allow agencies to base adjudi-
cative results solely on policy concerns?
Nevertheless, fifty years ago in SEC v. Chenery Corporation," the
Supreme Court refused to scrutinize closely an agency's decision to impose
a new policy-based rule" through the vehicle of an adjudicatory proceeding. 13
The Court's statement was clear: "the choice made between proceeding by
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency." 4 Chenery's statement
remains definitive today." Still, courts periodically have expressed concern
with the broad discretion agencies thereby enjoy. Since Chenery, the Supreme
the court at large to consider policy concerns explicitly, rather than just as a part of an attempt
to discover some hidden meaning in the statute. The Sherman Act is an example. The fact
remains, however, that most statutes that are as broad as the Sherman Act are entrusted to
agency administration, with the result that agency adjudication is more likely than its judicial
cousin to require explicit recourse to policy concerns as ends in themselves and not merely as
interpretive guides.
10. It may even be that agencies that have power to make policy by adjudication should
be considered to have the power to do so by rulemaking. See National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. VTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT § 2-104, Cmt. to 4 (1981).
11. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
12. The use of the word "rule" can be confusing because it is commonly understood to
refer both to legal requirements emerging from adjudications (as in "the rule that emerges from
Roe v. Wade"), and more precisely to the requirements that emerge from the administrative
rulemaking process. For convenience, this Article adopts the following usage: "rules," "legal
requirements," and "mandates" can refer to the product of either adjudications or rulemakings,
while "regulations" refer precisely to the products of the rulemaking process.
13. See generaly SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
14. Id. at203.
15. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD 3. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.8, at 267 (1994) ("Readers interested only in an understanding ofthe present state
of the law need go no further than Justice Murphy's 1947 opinion in Chenery."). However,
Professor Davis does not reject wholeheartedly judicially-imposed limits on agency freedom to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMNISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 1982 SUPPLEMENT § 7.25, at 186 (suggesting five part test for when courts
should be able to impose such limits).
354
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Court on at least two occasions has reversed lower court holdings limiting
agencies' discretion to set general policy in the course of adjudicating claims
against individual parties. The first of these cases, NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co.,16 produced a splintered rationale that only served to raise questions as to
the scope of the Chenery rule.17 Five years later, the second of these cases,
NLRB v. BellAerospace Co.,18 produced a unanimous analysis that seemed to
reconfirm Chenery.19 But Bell Aerospace noted a narrow exception to this
broad discretion that the Court did not fully explain because the facts of that
case did not implicate it. Since BellAerospace, several appellate courts, the
Ninth Circuit being the most aggressive, have experimented with the Bell
Aerospace exception, rejecting agency attempts to proceed via case-by-case
adjudication.20
This Article reconsiders federal agencies' discretion to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication, in light of the post-Bell Aerospace cases that
have sought to limit that discretion. It begins by laying the foundation for the
mlemaking/adjudication dichotomy, which in this area is not case law but the
Administrative Procedure Act.21 Part II then sets forth the three major
Supreme Court statements on this issue: Chenery, Wyman-Gordon, and Bell
Aerospace.' These discussions set the stage for the lower court opinions that
came after Bell Aerospace, the last of the Supreme Court trilogy. Part III
discusses these lower court cases, with particular attention to the Ninth
Circuit, which has developed the most detailed law on this issue.' It uncovers
three basic themes that courts use to reject agency decisions to proceed by
adjudication: a concern about the "functional" appropriateness of agency
adjudication when functionally the matter seems better suited for treatment by
rulemaking; a concern about the fairness of using an adjudication to establish
a new agency policy when adjudicative results normally are applied retroac-
tively; and a concern about the agency acting inconsistently with its own
initial decision to use the rulemaking process.
Part III's discussion sets forth the issues that this Article considers in a
more abstract way in Part IV. Part IV focuses on the functional and fairness
concerns identified above." Each provides a plausible basis for judicial
16. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
17. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
18. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
19. NLRB v. Bell Aerospaee Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part MII.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
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second-guessing of the agency's choice; Part IV examines their importance
and the workability of a jurisprudence based on each one.' It does so by
examining several different contexts in which agencies adjudicate, contexts
distinguished by either the generality or fact-specificity of the agency's action
and the novelty of the legal rule applied against the defendant. This method-
ology makes possible an inductive analysis that looks at actual agency actions
in order to illuminate the importance of each of these concerns, their interrela-
tionships, and the feasibility of possible solutions. Part V concludes that the
fairness concern is the only one justifying intrusive judicial review of the
agency's rulemaking/adjudication choice.26 To the extent agency adjudicative
results are usually imposed retroactively, vindication of the fairness concern
sometimes will require rejection of an agency's choice to proceed by adjudica-
tion. But because functional concerns sometimes militate so strongly in favor
of adjudication, vindication of the fairness concern will require allowing the
agency to proceed by adjudication but to apply the results prospectively. Part
V defends such a practice as fundamentally consistent with our basic under-
standing of the difference between legislation and adjudication, to the extent
that the results in such agency adjudications turn on the facts ofthe particular
party before the agency courtY
Part VI applies the lessons indicated by the preceding discussion, adds in
the "anti-circumvention" rule developed in the Ninth Circuit, and attempts to
distill operational rules guiding judicial review ofthe agency's choice between
rulemaking and adjudication.2 This application suggests that in fact the Ninth
Circuit's often-criticized jurisprudence may contain something valuable even
though the Ninth Circuit's rule may mark the outer limits of appropriate
judicial review. Part VII ends the Article with a brief discussion of the nature
of this general problem and how it illustrates larger issues concerning the role
of administrative agencies in our system of separated powers. 9
11 Rules, Adjudications, and the APA
An agency's decision to proceed by adjudication, as opposed to rule-
making, does not raise constitutional issues.3 ° It thus falls to the Adminis-
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part V.D.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See infra Part VII.
30. However, the opposite situation - i.e., an agency decision to proceed by rulemaking
instead of adjudication - might raise such a constitutional issue if the rulemaking process
imposes individualized burdens based on the burdened party's particular situation but does not
provide an adequate opportunity to be heard. This is saying nothing more than that the Due
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trative Procedure Act (APA) " to provide the limits on the agency's ability to
choose adjudication over rulemaking. The APA does not explicitly limit the
agency choice. Instead, any APA-based limits on this choice flow implicitly,
from the statute's structure. The basic structure of the APA is to classify all
administrative proceedings as either rulemakings or adjudications.32 The APA
does this in at least two ways. First; and most important it defines the uni-
verse of final agency action as either rulemaking or adjudication.33 Second,
it prescribes the procedure for both.34
The fact that the APA provides for both adjudication and rulemaking
does not directly speak to the agency's authority to choose between them. But
the APA does appear to distinguish between regulations and adjudicative
"orders" in a way so as to allow courts to tell the difference between one and
the other. Specifically, the statute defines a "rule" (i.e., a regulation)" in
relevant part as '"he whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or
prescribe law or policy,"36 while defining an adjudicatory order solely in
contrast to a regulation - namely, as a final agency action that is not a regula-
tion.37 Thus, this structure essentially takes the universe of final agency
actions, carves out a subset that it identifies as "regulations," and labels the
remainder as "orders" without ascribing any particular characteristics to that
Process Clause requires some opportunity to be heard when government imposes a particular-
ized burden on an individual. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. Singling out of
individuals for particularized burdening may also be a problem if the legislature performs it
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211,240 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that statute that commanded reopening of set of cases that had reached final judgment
was inappropriate legislative singling out of certain identifiable lawsuits); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that legislative veto by
which Congress vetoed proposed suspension of several named individuals' deportation consti-
tuted inappropriate legislative adjudication).
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (1994).
32. See U.S. DEPT. O1 JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TIvE PROCEDURE ACT 126 (1947) (Appendix to Attorney General's Statement); see also Jean
v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455,1475 (11th Cir. 1983).
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining "rule" as "the whole or a part of an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect"); id. § 551(6) (defining adjudicative
"order" as "the whole or a part of a final disposition... of an agency in a matter other than
rulemaking").
34. See id. § 553 (setting forth process for informal rulemaking); i&d § 554 (setting forth
process for formal adjudications); id. § 556-57 (setting forth particular requirements applying
to both formal rulemaking and formal adjudications). The APA has no explicit provisions for
informal adjudication.
35. See supra note 12 (noting definitional problems of word "rule").
36. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
37. See supra note 33 (listing statutory definitions found inAPA).
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latter class of actions. Intuitively, then, it seems to contemplate a distinction
between regulations and orders, as it does not ascribe similar characteristics
to both classes such that a particular agency action might be argued to consti-
tute one or the other. At base, the APA's treatment of the regulation/order
distinction suggests that there is but one question to ask: Does the agency
action satisfy the criteria for a regulation? If it does, then it must be consid-
ered a regulation (with all the procedural consequences that follow); if it does
not, then it falls into the catch-all category of orders.
In Bowen v. Georgetown UniversityHospital," Justice Scalia interpreted
this basic distinction as providing a judicially-enforceable limitation on the
means by which agencies can act.39 In Georgetown, the Court rejected an
agency's attempt to promulgate a regulation with significant retroactive effect,
on the ground that the substantive authorizing statute did not give the agency
the authority to issue retroactive regulations. Justice Scalia concurred, adding
his view that a retroactive regulation would violate the APA's basic dichot-
omy between regulations - which under the APA's definition have only
prospective effect - and adjudicative "orders" - which he argued must have
at least some retroactive effect.4" According to Justice Scalia, any analysis
that would result in the melding of rules and orders was incorrect, as it clashed
with '"he entire dichotomy [between rules and orders] upon which the most
significant portions of the APA are based."41 For Justice Scalia, then, there
has to be less than one-hundred-percent overlap between agency actions that
can be seen as regulations and those that can be seen as "orders." Ifthat is so,
then it follows that the APA limits an agency's discretion to proceed by its
choice of rulemaking or adjudication.
Justice Scalia is in good company in believing that some limits exist on
agencies' discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. A
number of appellate opinions have struck down agency adjudications on the
ground that the agency action was really a rulemaking, while the Supreme
Court has recognized the existence of at least theoretical limits on an agency's
discretion to proceed by adjudication. This Article now turns to an examina-
tion of the cases in which the Supreme Court has considered those limits, to
be followed by a discussion of subsequent cases from appellate courts.
38. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
39. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
40. See id. at 216-18 (Scalia, ., concurring). Justice Scalia did not suggest that Congress
could never authorize an agency to promulgate a retroactive regulation (which thus would blur
the APA's distinction between rules and orders). He did, however, suggest that such an authori-
zation would amount to an exemption from the default rules found in the APA. See id. at 224-
25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
AGENCYADJUDICATION
.11. The Foundational Supreme Court Statements
The Supreme Court has addressed the rlemaking/adjudication distinction
inthetrilogyofcases alreadybrieflymentioned: Chenery,42 Wyman-Gordon,43
and BellAerospace." Chenery and BellAerospace enunciate the current rule
of broad deference to agency decisions to choose between rulemaking and
adjudication. Wyman-Gordon, however, exposes the tension inherent in this
rule.
A. Chenery
Chenery arose from an SEC order refusing to approve a utility company's
bankruptcy reorganization plan, due to the plan's overly-favorable treatment
of management's stock purchases during the reorganization period. The
Commission originally had based its disapproval on its understanding of
general corporation law principles, but the Supreme Court struck down that
decision as a misreading of those principles.45 On remand, the Commission
reaffirmed its disapproval of the reorganization plan, but this time relied on
its interpretation of the standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935.4 When the case reached the Supreme Court for the second time, the
Court affirmed the agency's order. For our purposes, the important part of the
opinion is its discussion of the process by which the SEC established its
interpretation ofthe statute as agency policy. The Court made it clear that the
SEC would be allowed to establish such an interpretation by means of a
particularized order rather than a general regulation:
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute
can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some
principles mustawaittheirowndevelopment, while others mustbeadjusted
to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important
functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be
equippedto act eitherby general rule orbyindividual order. To insist upon
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over neces-
sity.
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved
despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have
had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying
its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem maybe so
specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the
42. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text infra Part IIA.
43. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; infra Part BILB.
44. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying tot infra Part I.LC.
45. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1994).
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boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain
powerto deal withthe problems ona case-to-casebasis ifthe administrative
process is tobe effective. There is thus averydefiniteplace for the case-by-
case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between pro-
ceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.'
.Boiled down, Justice Murphy's analysis relies on three general reasons
that an agency might not be able to have a regulation in place before it wishes
to take action against a private party. First, general principles may not have
had a chance to ripen into particular rules that the agency could promulgate
because the agency has had insufficient experience with either the statutory
mandate and/or the particular regulatory issue. Second, situations arise that
the agency simply could not have foreseen but that nevertheless demand rapid
agency action. Third, the nature ofthe issue may simply be incompatible with
regulation through a general rule. According to Chenery, these possibilities
justify the agency's broad discretion to decide when to proceed via adjudica-
tion.
Chenery's conclusion that an agency has such broad discretionmeans that
sometimes an agency will impose retroactive liability on a private party. Ifthe
principle imposed on the party is not obvious from the underlying statute, but
instead represents a policy-based decision within the scope of discretion the
statute grants the agency, a party may well be adjudged liable of violating a
provision of which it had no prior notice. The Chenery Court made it clear that
such retroactivity was not necessarily illegal. Instead, Chenery required that
courts test such retroactivity by means of a balancing test, in which the retroac-
tivity is "balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary
to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is
greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is
not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by the law."48 The Court
easily concluded that the SEC was justified in applying its rule retroactively."
B. Wyman-Gordon
The broad discretion Chenery bestowed on the agency to decide between
rulemaking and adjudication was thrown into question twenty-five years later
in Wyman-Gordon. Wyman-Gordon arose out ofanNLRB adjudicatory order
directing that a representation election be held for a particular unit of Wyman-
Gordon employees. The provision ofthe order challenged before the Supreme
Court required the firm to turn over to the NLRB an address list of all the
47. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,202-03 (1947).
48. Id. at203.
49. Id.
360
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eligible voters in that election, which the NLRB planned to turn over to the
competing unions."°
As support for this disclosure requirement, the NLRB's opinion cited only
a previous NLRB adjudicatory order, Excelsior Underwear, Inc." But in
Wyman-Gordon, the company attacked the validity of the Excelsior order
itself, arguing that it was invalid as the product of an illegal procedure. Specif-
ically, when the NLRB adjudicated the Excelsior case it invited a number of
parties to submit amicus briefs on the address list disclosure issue. Then, after
ruling in favor of requiring disclosure, the NLRB declined to enforce the
requirement in the pending case against Excelsior, but instead made the
disclosure rule apply only prospectively. According to Wyman-Gordon, this
conduct rendered the Excelsior process in reality a rulemaking, which thus was
invalid for failure to comply with the APA's rulemaking requirements. In turn,
according to the company, the invalidity of the Excelsior order left the
NLRB's order against Wyman-Gordon devoid of any support.
Wyman-Gordon produced an extremely fractured Court. Justice Fortas,
writing for a plurality of four, agreed with the company that the Excelsior
process constituted a rulemaking, and, as such, was invalid for having failed
to comply with the APA's rulemaking provisions.52 Nevertheless, the plural-
ity concluded that the NLRB's direction to Wyman-Gordon to disclose the
address list was valid, as the agency had the authority to impose such a
requirement even if it was unsupported by the precedent of the now-discred-
ited Excelsior case.53 This latter conclusion - that the order against Wyman-
Gordon was valid - became the holding of the Court, as an opinion by Justice
Black, joined by two other Justices, took the position that the NLRB had done
nothing wrong in Excelsior and thus that the Excelsior rule was available as
support for the order against Wyman-Gordon.' To confuse the matter even
further, the plurality's first conclusion - that the NLRB's process in Excelsior
was an invalid attempt at rulemaking - also commanded a majority of the
Court, as the votes of Justices Douglas and Harlan, both of whom would have
reversed the order against Wyman-Gordon because of the invalidity of the
Excelsior order, supplemented the plurality's four votes on this point.55 Thus,
Supreme Court majorities both condemned the Excelsior process and upheld
the disclosure requirement against Wyman-Gordon, which was not supported
by anything except the discredited Excelsior rule.
50. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,761 (1969) (plurality opinion).
51. 156 N.L.R.B. 111 (1966).
52. See Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 764 (plurality opinion).
53. See id. at 769 (plurality opinion).
54. See id. at 769-75 (Black, J., concurring in result).
55. See id. at 775-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 781-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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When put alongside Chenery, Wyman-Gordon brings into sharp focus the
problem of agency adjudication. At least part ofthe problem a majority of the
Wyman-Gordon Court had with the Excelsior order regarded its purely pro-
spective effect. However, Chenery held out the at-least theoretical possibility
that an agency order could be struck down as inappropriately retroactive if it
failed the balancing test described in that case." The combination ofthese two
conclusions leaves the agency with the possibility that an adjudication could
be struck down as either inappropriately retroactive or inappropriately pro-
spective. In fact, if Wyman-Gordon's concern about pure prospectivity takes
the form of a per se rule against such a practice, then logically an agency
sometimes simply will be unable to proceed by adjudication. To illustrate,
consider a situation in which an agency is considering imposing a substantial
liability on a party, based either onthe agency's new understanding of a statute
or new policy concern. If the imposition of such a liability is prohibited
because it fails the Chenery test, then the agency effectively will be prohibited
from using adjudication because purely prospective announcement of the rule
also would be of at least questionable legality after Wyman-Gordon.
The illogic ofthe situation after Wyman-Gordon reflects a larger problem
with agency adjudication. -If agency adjudication really is analogous to judicial
adjudication, then problems of unfair retroactivity would arise rarely. At least
when courts interpret statutory law, the concern underlying the retroactivity
bar - lack of notice of the law7 - does not arise because the law at least for-
mally existed before the judicial interpretation, and thus there is no real retro-
activity.5" And as pointed out by commentators such as Nicholas Zeppos,59 the
most effective common-law decisions suggest that what is happening is incre-
mental change rather than wholesale repudiation of pre-existing rules. Indeed,
even constitutional decisions, often considered to be the type of adjudication
least cabined by pre-existing law, can be conceived of as fundamentally incre-
mental and bound to prior precedent even when it is being extended beyond
that precedent.' By contrast, when an agency adjudicates, it need not confine
itself to existing law, but instead is able to place upon that law the gloss of
56. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,203 (1947) (enunciating test balancing "the
ill effect of the retroactive application of a standard" against "the mischief of producing a result
-which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal or equitable principles").
57. See id. at 217 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
58. Obviously, this discussion does not deal with legislative retroactivity.
59. See, e.g., Zeppos, supra note 6, at 1148-49.
60. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing
substantive due process jurisprudence in which process of interpolation and rational extrapola-
tion from enumerated guarantees found in Bill of Rights identifies fundamental rights). See
generally Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Right,
57 U. CIM L. REV. 1057 (1990) (describing substantive due process jurisprudence in which
process of rational harmonization of precedent identifies fundamental rights).
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entirely novel policy concerns, in effect explicitly and self-consciously making
new law. Chenery illustrates that sort of agency lawmaking. Thus, agencies
make new law in an explicit manner not done by courts when they apply the
common law or interpret statutes or even constitutional provisions."
At the same time that we confront the reality of agency adjudicative
lawmaking, however, our intuition - buttressed by the APA62 - analogizes
between agency adjudication and judicial action, and thus arises a concern
about agency adjudicative prospectivity. If agency adjudication is just like its
judicial cousin, how can agencies be allowed to adjudicate with purely pro-
spective consequences? This question is important to a proper understanding
of agency adjudication because judicial retroactivity is not only normal, but
is, at least in the federal system, arguably inherent in the idea of adjudica-
tion.63 If the answer is that because agencies make law when they adjudicate,
this only raises the question of whether we can attach usefully the term "ad-
judication" to anything an agency does. This suspicion of agency adjudicative
prospectivity only is heightened by the fact that courts are predisposed to
accept arguments that an agency has rulemaking authority.' So, to amend the
previous question: If agency adjudication is just like its judicial cousin, how
can agencies be allowed to adjudicate with purely prospective consequences,
especially when purely prospective action already can be taken through the
rulemaking power? One obvious answer to this question is that adjudication
may be a superior format for agency action given the particularized nature of
some aspect of the issue. In fact, the particularized nature of the issue con-
fronting the agency was central to the Court's analysis in Bell Aerospace, the
last of the cases in the Supreme Court's rulemaking-adjudication trilogy.
C. Bell Aerospace
The issue in Bell Aerospace was whether certain groups of corporate
purchasers for Bell Aerospace could claim the National Labor Relations Act's
61. But see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536-37 (1991) (citing
cases in which Supreme Court has applied its decisions prospectively).
62. See supra Part H (discussing APA).
63. See, e.g., James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)
(concluding that purely prospective application of new rules that Supreme Court litigation
establishes would violate nature of judicial review). I should note, though, that state courts
sometimes have authority to act in ways that would constitute separation of powers violations
if the federal courts performed them; for example, some state courts have the authority to issue
advisory opinions. See, e.g., MAE CONST. art. VI, § 3 (authorizing Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine to issue advisory opinions); State v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081-83 (Ohio 1999)
(discussing criteria for "public action," obviating standing requirement).
64. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 691 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting "the overwhelming judicial support given to expansive agency readings of statu-
tory rule-making authorizations that are not flatly inconsistent with other statutory provisions").
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(NLRA) protection for employee unionization. A year before considering the
situation of Bell Aerospace's purchasers, the NLRB had decided in another
adjudication, North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.,65 that "managerial
employees" could claim the NLRA's protection as long as they satisfied a test
focusing on their possible conflicts of interest as unionized managers.'
According to the Bell Aerospace Court, the North Arkansas conflict of interest
test reflected a reversal of the agency's longstanding position that employees
allied with management could never come within the NLRA's protection.67
In Bell Aerospace, the NLRB applied the North Arkansas test and decided that
the NLRA did in fact protect the purchasers' organizing efforts.
The Court reversed the NLRB's reading of the statute and remanded the
case.' Because it reversed on the merits, the Court did not consider the proce-
dural propriety ofthe North Arkansas rule. In other words, it did not consider
whether, as in Wyman-Gordon, the North Arkansas rule - representing a
significant change from earlier agency practice - should have been enacted by
a rulemaking as opposed to an adjudication. 69 However, the Court's decision
that the NLRA completely excluded managerial employees meant that on
remand the NLRB would have to determine whether the purchasers were in
fact "managerial employees." The Court then proceeded to discuss whether the
NLRB could make this determination by adjudication, or whether, as the court
of appeals had held, this determination demanded rulemaking.
In deciding the rulemaking-adjudication issue, the Court cited Chenery's
broad deference to the agency's choice and Wyman-Gordon's recognition that
adjudication can serve as the vehicle for the formulation of agency policy.
However, the Court did state that in some situations reliance on adjudication
"would amount to an abuse of discretion.""° According to the Court, though,
this was not one of those situations. In allowing the agency to proceed by
adjudication, the Court noted the variety of factual situations that the
employee-or-manager question implicates and concluded that any generalized
standard probably would not be very useful. The Court also concluded that
industry reliance on prior NLRB decisions did not require a different result.
In so concluding, the Court noted several factors:
It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing from such
reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from recon-
sidering the issue in an adjudicativeproceeding. Furthermore, this is not a
65. 185 N.L.R1B. 550 (1970).
66. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,270-72 (1974) (describing NLRB's
action inNorthArkansasElectric Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970)).
67. See BellAerospace, 416 U.S. at 287-88.
68. Id. at 289-90.
69. Id. at291.
70. Id. at 294.
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case inwhich some new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for
past actions which were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pronounce-
ments. Nor are fines or damages involved here.7'
Thus, the fact-specific nature of the issue in Bell Aerospace justified
deference to the agency's choice between adjudication and rulemaking. But
because the issue did not implicate private party reliance interests, the Bell
Aerospace Court was able to suggest, consistent with Chenery's retroactivity
analysis, that such interests theoretically might limit the agency's discretion
to make this choice.
IV Subsequent Appellate Court Case Law
Federal appellate coifrts considering challenges to agency adjudications
have been left with the task of distilling a rule from Chenery, Wyman-Gordon,
and Bell Aerospace. These cases combine rhetoric and holdings indicating
broad deference to agency decisions with suggestions that such deference is
not unlimited. Chenery recognized that an agency adjudication may be
unfairly retroactive,72 Wyman-Gordon suggested that the procedure of such an
adjudication or its purely prospective application may convert the purported
adjudication into a de facto rulemaking, 3 and Bell Aerospace identified
detrimental reliance as a factor to be considered in determining the appropri-
ateness of the retroactivity that normally results from agency adjudication.74
The mixed signals sent by these cases have led lower federal courts to
experiment with limitations on agency freedom to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication. While the Ninth Circuit has engaged in the most aggressive
experimentation with such limitations, other federal courts have tinkered on the
margins of the general rule that the rulemaking/adjudication choice remains
with the agency. This part ofthe Article examines appellate courts' post-Bell
Aerospacejurisprudence. The principles developed inthose cases will provide
the foundation for this Article's more general discussion of agency discretion
to choose between rulemaking and adjudication.
A. The Development of the Law in the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in a series of cases starting inthe 1970s, has developed
and refined a jurisprudence governing agencies' discretion to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication. While some commentators75 and courts76 gener-
71. Id. at 295.
72. See supra Part ILA (discussing Chenery).
73. See supra Part IILB (discussing Wyman-Gordon).
74. See supra Part LC (discussing BellAerospace).
75. See, e.g., I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, § 6.8.
76. See, e.g., Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288,1294 (7th Cir. 1988); NewYork Eye
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ally focus onthe 1981 case of FordMotor Company v. FTC77 when discussing
the Ninth Circuit law on this issue, in fact an earlier case, Patel v. INS,
provides the first real glimpse of the court's developing jurisprudence. 9
1. The Beginning: Patel
In Patel, the court considered an INS adjudicatory decision denying an
alien's request for discretionary suspension of deportation."0 The alien, Patel,
based his request on his status as an investor in a U.S. business, as allowed by
INS regulations enacted in 1973.81 The agency determined, however, that
Patel had not satisfied the "investor exception," reading into it a requirement
that the investment ' t end to expand job opportunities" in the United States. 2
In so holding, the agency relied on an earlier adjudication, In re Heitland,83
that had established the job creation requirement. The problem in Patel arose
because Heitland had interpreted an earlier version of the investor exception
regulation and had stated only in dicta that the then-recently promulgated
1973 regulation also included a job creation requirement.8 4
Thus, the situation confronting the court in Patel paralleled that in
Wyman-Gordon: The agency first had established a legal principle during
an adjudicatory proceeding (in Wyman-Gordon the disclosure requirement
established inExcelsior, and in Patel the job-creation requirement purportedly
established in Heitland). In both cases the agency then tried to apply the
principle in a later adjudication (against, respectively, the Wyman-Gordon
Company or Mr. Patel). But again in both cases, there was something inap-
propriate about the adjudicatory format by which the agency established the
original rule. In Wyman-Gordon, the problem arose from Excelsior's quasi-
rulemaking procedure and its purely prospective effect, while the problem in
Patel was that Heitland used pure dicta "prospectively [to] pronounc[e] a
broad, generally applicable requirement, without then applying that require-
ment to aliens seeking exemptions under the 1973 regulation. "85 Thus, just as
& Ear Infirmary v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 396, 406 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Colorado Dep't of
Soo. Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 585 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Colo. 1984).
77. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
79. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981); Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d
1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
80. Patel, 638 F.2d at 1201.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1202.
83. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA 1974).
84. Id. at 566-67.
85. Patel, 638 F.2d at 1204.
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the Supreme Court had done in Wyman-Gordon, the court reversed the agency
for relying on an adjudicatory precedent that somehow was insufficiently
"judicial."
But the court did not stop at the parallel to Wyman-Gordon, merely
refusing to accept the agency's reliance on the Heitland dicta. Instead, it went
on to question the appropriateness of promulgating any job-creation require-
ment through adjudication. The court first noted that the agency had consid-
ered inserting such a requirement into the proposed rule that eventually
became the 1973 regulation, but after public comment the agency had elimi-
nated the requirement.86 The court also noted that a regulation promul-
gated subsequent to Patel's application (and thus not applicable to his case)
included a job creation requirement. 7 Because the agency had first tenta-
tively, and later conclusively, utilized the rulemaking process to establish the
job creation requirement, the court concluded that that issue did not by its
nature require case-by-case resolution.88 Thus, the court concluded, the case
fell outside Bell Aerospace's admonition that certain issues must be decided
by adjudication because of their fact-specific character.89 The court then
closed its analysis by noting two issues that grew in importance in later Ninth
Circuit case law. First, the court found a notice problem in the agency's
inconsistent conduct in the period before Patel's application; namely, with-
drawing the job-creation criterion from its proposed 1973 regulation but
"obscurely"9' adding the requirement in Heitland dicta.9 Second, the court
noted the severe hardship Patel would face, given the extreme liberty-impair-
ing quality of deportation. 2
Patel laid the analytical groundwork for subsequent Ninth Circuit juris-
prudence. First, the court relied primarily on its conclusion that the agency's
use of adjudication to establish the job creation requirement impermissibly
"circumvent[ed]"'93 both prior and subsequent rulemaking processes. In addi-
tion to this procedural flaw, the court found a more fundamental problem in
the agency's resolution of this issue by adjudication - the agency's own con-
duct suggested that the rule could be stated in a general regulation.94 Finally,
86. Id. at 1202.
87. Id. at 1202 n.2.
88. Id. at 1205.
89. See id. ("In contrast [to the situation in BellAerospace], the job-creation criterion...
does not call for a case-by-case determination. It may be stated and applied as a general rule
even though the result may vary from case to case.").
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1204.
94. Id.
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the court noted the burden that retroactivity imposed on the private party
target and the target's lack of notice of the rule.95 All of these concerns
ultimately found their way into the developing Ninth Circuit law.
2. The Development: Ford Motor
In Ford Motor, the Ninth Circuit continued to develop its limitations
on agency discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. 6 Ford
Motor concerned a challenge to an FTC adjudication against an Oregon-based
Ford dealership and Ford Motor Company concerning accounting practices
they employed to calculate the value of repossessed cars. The agency brought
these charges while it was involved in a rulemaking process aimed at regu-
lating closely related practices that the same classes of businesses employed.'
The court disallowed the agency's use of adjudications to attack these
practices. Relying on Patel, the court framed the issue as whether the adjudi-
cation "change[d] existing law, and ha[d] widespread application."98 The
court's analysis then considered those two issues. The court first rejected
the agency's argument that the defendants' practices violated Oregon law. It
noted that the relevant Oregon statute was part of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), but that the agency had cited no case from any UCC jurisdiction
that interpreted the Code to prohibit the challenged practices.9 The court
then highlighted the general applicability of the legal principle emerging
from the adjudication. The court noted that the UCC provision on which the
agency based its charge existed in forty-nine states, and that the agency was
preparing to notify car dealerships across the nation of the decision, presum-
ably in order to inform them of the requirements that they would have to
meet."° The court's conclusion reflected its hesitation to allow adjudication
to achieve industry-wide changes, while at the same time expressing con-
cern over the fact that the agency was involved in a pending rulemaking on
related issues:
To allow the order to stand as presently written would do far more than
remedy a discrete violation of a singular Oregon law as the FrC contends;
it would create a nationalinterpretation ofUCC § 9-504 and in effect enact
the precise rule the FTC has proposed, but not yet promulgated.'0
95. Id. at 1205.
96. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 1010.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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3. The Limiting and Solidiyng of Ford Motor
Subsequent Ninth Circuit opinions have recast the FordMotor test so as
to preserve somewhat more agency discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication. Still, the rule that has emerged imposes potentially signifi-
cant limitations on that discretion. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC,1' 2
decided one year after Ford Motor, the court considered an adjudication-
derived legal principle that the agency claimed was based on its interpretation
of an existing regulation. °3 The court, however, believed it necessary to
consider whether that interpretation was instead a de facto amendment to the
rule, in which case, according to the court, the agency would have to resort to
the normal agency rulemaking process."' In the court's view, "an adjudica-
tory restatement of the rule becomes an amendment.. . if the restatement so
alters the requirements of the rule that the regulated party had inadequate
notice of the required conduct."'0° In deciding this issue, the court compared
the text of the regulation to the standards announced in the adjudication. 6
The court also examined "the agency's prior use of rule-making and the
current adjudication to see if the agency's conduct in the latter [was] consis-
tent with the proceedings in the former."'"°
The two factors considered in Montgomery Ward have become the basis
of current Ninth Circuit law. In Cities of Anaheim v. FERC,08 the court
explicitly identified "[tiwo exceptions qualify[ing] [the] general proposition"
that "[a]dministrative agencies are free to announce new principles during
adjudication-' °9 First, "agencies may not impose undue hardship by suddenly
changing direction, to the detriment of those who have relied on past pol-
icy.' 10 Second, "agencies may not use adjudication to circumvent the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act's rulemaking procedures." ' In rejecting the plain-
tiffs' claim that the agency should have been required to act by rulemaking,
the court seemed to cast doubt on the broader rule enunciated in FordMotor:
The cities, seizing uponbroad language in Ford Motor Co., argue that any
agencyprinciple of general applicationthat changes existinglaw mustpass
through formal rulemaking procedures. Even if this were an accurate
102. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982).
103. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322,1326-27 (9th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 1329.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. d.
108. 723 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1984).
109. Cities ofAnaheim v. FERC, 723 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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statement of the law, FERC's clarification of its suspension policy [in a
prior adjudication] ... was a minor adjustment, a fine tuning of doctrine
that does not require rulemaling unless it imposes severe hardship or
circumvents existing rules. By contrast, FordMotor Co. involved a new
interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code that would have changed
long-standing creditor practices."1
Thus, while distinguishing Ford Motor on its facts, the Cities court appears
to have sought to narrow its potentially broad sweep by applying its test more
cautiously. The Cities analysis has been cited by subsequent courts and ap-
pears to have become the generally accepted rule in the circuit."3 The Ninth
Circuit's more circumspect approach to the agency's rulemaking/adjudication
decision is also evident in the aftermath of the cases; since Ford Motor, the
court has refrained from striking down adjudications on the ground that the
agency should have proceeded instead by nlemaking." 4
B. Case Law from Outside the Ninth Circuit
For the most part, courts outside the Ninth Circuit have refused to em-
brace FordMotor and its progeny."' However, some courts have refrained
from completely deferring to agencies' discretion to choose between rule-
making and adjudication. The opinions generally have relied on slightly dif-
ferent combinations of the factors noted in FordMotor, especially the general
or specific nature of the facts at issue in the challenged adjudication and the
extent to which retroactive application of the adjudicative result imposed an
unfair burden on the defendant.
1. First Bancorporation:
The Functional Appropriateness ofAdjudication
Outside ofthe Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit appears to have adoptedthe
strongest principle limiting agency discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication. InFirstBancorporation v. Board ofGovernors,n 6 that court
set aside an adjudicatory order issued by the Federal Reserve, partially on the
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. See, e.g., Union Flights, Inc. v. FAA, 957 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1992); Coos-
Curry Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Jura, 821 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Weight Watchers
v. FTC, 830 F. Supp. 539, 542-43 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
114. See supra note 113.
115. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 883 F.2d 1029,1031 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearing); Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288,
1294-95 (7th Cir. 1988); New York Eye & Ear Infirmary v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 396, 406
n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Department of Health & Human Servs.,
585 F. Supp. 522,525 (D. Colo. 1984).
116. 728 F.2d 434(10th Cir. 1984).
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ground that the order constituted an attempt to set legislative policy and thus
properly was made only via a rulemaking procedure." 7 The court concluded
that the agency had "examined no specific facts about the potential adverse
effects" ofthe private party's proposed action, but "instead made broad conclu-
sions" that important statutory policies would be undermined unless the private
party was not restricted from acting as it wished."' "Thus," according to the
court, "the Board's order contain[ed] no adjudicative facts having any particu-
larized relevance to the petitioner."'" 9 The Court therefore held thatthe agency
had "abused its discretion by improperly attempting to propose legislative
policy by an adjudicative order."'20
The Tenth Circuit has continued to adhere to that decision. For example,
inMatzke v. Block,' the Tenth Circuit, citing First Bancorporation, required
the Agriculture Department to promulgate regulations to implement a statu-
tory mandate giving the agency the discretion to defer repayments on farm
loans."z The court noted the urgency ofthe problem facing the borrowers and
concluded that the need for quick relief required the agency to set up standard-
ized procedural and substantive guidelines governing the decisions to grant or
deny that relief.'23
Other courts also have held agencies to the APA's rulemaking procedures
when the agency's action could be described as enunciation of a generally
applicable rule. For example, in American Trucking Association v. United
States,"'24 the Eleventh Circuit characterized as a regulation a decision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission to revoke all "special permission authori-
ties" (SPAs) to trucking rate bureaus.'2 Essentially, these SPAs were authori-
zations to the bureaus, granted bureau-by-bureau, to change their rates more
117. First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 1984).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 732 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
122. Malzke v. Block, 732 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984).
123. See id. at 802; see also Rapp v. Department of Treasury, 52 F.3d 1510,1521-22 (10th
Cir. 1995) (citing First Bancorporation but concluding that character of agency's action
justified adjudication).
124. 688 F.2d 1337 (1 th Cir. 1982).
125. See American TruckingAss'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337,1348 (1 th Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. ICC v. American Trucking Ass'n, 467 U.S. 354 (1984). A rate bureau is an
arrangement whereby firms, usually trucking firms or railroads, can meet to discuss pricing
information. See Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Case for Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (If
Repeal Is Not an Option), 23 IIARv. J,. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 27 (1999). Such bureaus enjoy
statutory immunity from antitrust regulation. See Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic,
and Legal Anasis ofMunicipal Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGE COM-
PUrIE & TaCIL L.J. 1, 37 n.193 (1999).
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quickly than normally allowed by law. According to the court, the agency was
arguing essentially that its action effectively was a series of adjudications
revoking particular SPAs.126 The court rejected that position, reasoning that
the generally applicable nature of the agency's decision rendered it a regula-
tion.1' Unlike First Bancorporation, American Trucking did not discuss the
legislative character of the facts crucial to the agency's reasoning. However,
the cases are similar in that both courts relied on the general applicability of
the agency's action to reject the agency's claim that it really was engaging in
adjudication.
2. Denial of Notice
As Chenery suggested, agency adjudication may be vulnerable to the
charge that it has resulted in the imposition of unfairly retroactive liability.
The main concern here is a situation in which the adjudication results in the
establishment of a new legal standard that is then applied against the target's
past conduct. Before reaching that problem, however, it may be useful to
mention a smaller, more easily resolved notice problem.
a. Denial of"Procedural" Notice
In this second version of the notice issue, the agency begins adjudicating
a party's liability without having established the legal standard against which
it will judge the party's conduct. Thus, the adjudication features argument
both on the proper legal standard and on whether that alleged standard was
satisfied. Obviously, the uncertainty surrounding the applicable legal standard
can severely handicap the party's argument that its conduct was lawful. Thus,
in these cases the private party argued that the process made it impossible for
it to make an effective presentation regarding its compliance with the law.
An influential case of this sort, relied on by subsequent cases present-
ing the same problem, is Hill v. FPC.1" Hill dealt with a ratemaking pro-
ceeding conducted by the Federal Power Commission. In reviewing the
proposed rates that natural gas producers submitted, the Commission pur-
ported to apply a standard enunciated in an adjudication decided several years
126. SeeAmerican Trucking, 688 F.2d at 1348.
127. See id. For similar analyses, see Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1474-77 (1 th Cir.
1983), finding that INS policy not to allow discretionary parole to deportees was a regulation,
based on the generality of the rule, and Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 699-
702 (5th Cir. 1979), finding that the agency had engaged in rulemaking when the ICC an-
nounced that it would discontinue its long-standing informal practice of giving competing
carriers notice before issuing emergency, temporary operating authority. But see id. at 699 n.3
(noting that agency did not contest characterization of action as rule, but simply argued that it
came within one or more exceptions to APA"s notice and comment requirement for rulemaking).
128. 335 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1964).
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earlier." It rejected the proposed rates, finding that the producers failed to
use the appropriate factors in computing their costs."3' The Commission also
refused the producers' request to submit the proof the Commission thus had
required.3 The court reversed the agency, concluding that prior agency
statements had not provided a sufficiently clear legal standard to guide the
party's evidentiary presentation, and that the agency's refusal to reopen the
proceedings to allow the party to present the relevant evidence deprived the
producers of a fair hearing.'32
Notice cases following Hill repeated this basic template. Courts applying
Hill have examined whether the party had actual notice, regardless of its
formality. For example, in Central Arkansas Auction Sale v. Bergland33 the
agency waited until the day the hearing commenced before giving the private
party a copy of the rate computation method the agency was planning to use
to judge the party's compliance with the law.' The court nevertheless upheld
the adjudication because the agency did not object when the party asked for
and received a continuance of the hearing in order to study and reply to the
computation method it had just received. 3 ' While the court expressed misgiv-ings about the advisability of this way of proceeding, it nevertheless con-
cluded that the continuance provided adequate notice, which was all that the
law required.136
The relation of these cases to the ChenerylBell Aerospace problem is
clear. Certainly, one solution to the procedural problem of inadequate ad-
129. Hill v. FPC, 335 F.2d 355,357 (5th Cir. 1964).
130. Id. at358.
131. Id. at357.
132. Id. at 361-62.
133. 570 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1978).
134. Central Ark. Auction Sale v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 724,726 (8th Cir. 1978).
135. See id. at 730-31.
136. Id. at 727-28; see also Giles Lowery Stockyards v. Department of Agric., 565 F.2d
321,325-26 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding agency procedure by which agency used letter to inform
private party of standard by which it would be judged at upcoming adjudication, even when
standard was not officially adopted until adjudication itself). Similarly, courts striking down
agency action on this basis have focused on whether the challenging party had a realistic
opportunity to provide evidence relevant to the legal standard. For example, in Hatch v. FERC,
654 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court struck down an adjudication in which the agency
changed a 40 year-old legal standard in a manner disadvantageous to the private litigant Hatch,
654 F.2d at 837. The court acknowledged that both sides argued the question of the proper legal
standard before the ALJ, but noted that the ALl had reserved his ruling on the legal question and
never explicitly suggested that the private party present evidence relevant to the new standard.
Id. In the court's view, the AL's actions made it impossible to construe the private party's
action as a waiver of its right to present evidence relevant to the standard that the ALJ ultimately
adopted. Id. at 836; see also Port Terminal RR. Ass'n v. United States, 551 F.2d 1336,1345-46
(5th Cir. 1977) (striking down agency adjudication because of lack of notice to private party of
legal standard agency ultimately used).
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vance notice ofthe legal standard is for the agency to promulgate the standard
by means of a rule. By promulgating such a rule, the private party would be
put on notice of the type of evidence it should present during the adjudication.
Indeed, the private parties in some of these cases argued that the agency
should be required to proceed by rulemaking. 7 Such a requirement would,
of course, flatly contradict at least the spirit of Chenery and, arguably, would
not find support in BellAerospace's narrow exception, which speaks more to
substantive reliance interests than procedural fairness. Unsurprisingly, then,
the courts in these cases - even those that reversed the agency's actions -
recognized the agency's freedom to proceed by adjudication."
Ultimately, prohibiting the agency fromusing adjudication is unnecessary,
given that a much simpler - and legally uncontroversial - expedient exists: the
bifurcation of the hearing. Under this solution to the problem, the agency
would conduct a hearing that aimed at determining the correct legal standard,
and then would adjourn the proceedings in order to give the private party the
opportunity to collect and present evidence relevant to the newly-enunciated
standard. The courts striking down the agency's adjudication all suggested this
approach, 39 and the proceeding in Central Arkansas - where the hearing was
continued to give the private party a chance to prepare his case in light of the
newly-disclosed standard - appears actually to have followed this model. 4
b. Denial of "Substantive" Notice
A more serious notice problem arises when an agency applies a newly-
established legal rule to past private party conduct, thus giving rise to a claim
of unfair retroactivity. Recall that, to deal with these claims, Chenery an-
nounced a balancing test that weighed the burden that the retroactive applica-
tion imposed against the "mischief' of producing a result "contrary to statu-
tory design or to legal or equitable principles."'41 Thirty years later, the Bell
Aerospace Court, without explicitly referring to the Chenery retroactivity test,
relied on the lack of retroactive penalties in allowing an agency to act via an
adjudication. 42 To complicate matters slightly, two years before BellAero-
space, the D.C. Circuit, in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v.
137. See, e.g., CentralArk, 570 F.2d at 726-27; GilesLowery, 565 F.2d at 325.
138. See Hill v. FPC, 335 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1964) ('We would not for a moment
suggest that the Commission should, or could for that matter, lay down once and for all the
standards to be applied in natural gas producer cases."); see also CentralArkansas, 570 F.2d at
1346 n.5 (acknowledging general lack of any requirementthat agency proceed by rule as opposed
to adjudication); Giles Lowery, 565 F.2d at 325 (same); Port Terminal, 551 F.2d at 1341 (same).
139. See Hatch, 654 F.2d at 835; Port Terminal, 551 F2d at 1345; Hill, 335 F.2d at 364.
140. See Central Ark. Auction Sale v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 724,727 (8th Cir. 1978).
141. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,203 (1947).
142. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267,295 (1974).
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NLRB 143 enunciated a test to judge the appropriateness of retroactive agency
action when the rulemaking-versus-adjudication issue is not present.144 Ap-
pellate courts145 confronted with that precise question largely have adopted
this test.1
46
Several decisions have relied on the Chenery/Bell Aerospace doctrine to
reverse agency adjudication results on the ground that they impermissibly
impaired private parties' reliance interests on a prior legal regime. For exam-
ple, in United Gas Pipe Line Company v. FERC,14 the Fifth Circuit considered
agency use of adjudication to impose a new rule regarding gas pipeline compa-
nies' authority to recover from their customers funds that they had advanced
to gas production companies for exploration and production.148  The first
version of this rule disallowed recoverability for advances unless the producer
spent the advance within a "reasonable time." The next year, the agency denied
a pipeline company's recovery request on the ground that the producers had
143. 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
144. See Retail, Wholesale&Dep'tStoreUnion v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380,390-91 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (enunciating five factor test to judge claims of unfair agency retroactivity, considering:
(1) whether case was one of first impression; (2) whether new rule represented abrupt departure
from prior law, (3) degree to which affected party relied on any former rule; (4) degree of burden
imposed by retroactive application of new rule; and (5) statutory interest in applying new rule
despite any private party reliance on preexisting standard). Essentially, the Retail, Wholesale
test echoes Chenery. Not only does it repeat, in more detail, the factors going into the balancing
test, but it also asks whether the case was one of first impression, echoing Chenery's observation
that every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, but that such retroactivity by itself
cannot make the action illegitimate. Compare id. with Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
145. See Abner S. Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity in Administrative Law, 1991 SUP.
CT. REV. 261,273 n.44 (listing cases adopting Retail, Wholesale test).
146. It is a difficult question whether the Chenery/Bell Aerospace doctrine responds to
precisely the same concern as the Retail, Wholesale test. Superficially it does not Chenery
speaks to the question whether an agency should be required to proceed by rulemaking as
opposed to adjudication, while Retail, Wholesale asks when an agency should be prohibited from
applying a new rule retroactively. Of course, if prospectivity corresponds with rulemaking, and
retroactivity with adjudication, then the two tests do in fact speak to the same question. But if,
for example, an agency can be allowed to adjudicate with purely prospective effect, then the
analogy is broken, as a decision prohibiting agency retroactivity in a particular case does not
necessarily mean that it is also prohibited from acting through adjudication. Thus, a judicial
decision prohibiting agency retroactivity may affect the agency differently than a decision
prohibiting an agency from adjudicating. It follows then that, even though the two tests are quite
similar, see supra note 144, courts may apply them differently, if a court takes into account the
effect any limitation it imposes may have on the flexibility remaining to the agency. Indeed,
taking this factor into account seems almost mandated by the requirement - present in both
tests - that the court consider the impact a prohibition on retroactivity would have on the
effectuation of the regulatory policy. For this reason this Article, and, specifically, this part of
the Article, focuses mainly on courts that explicitly relied on Chenery or BellAerospace, and
places only secondary emphasis on courts applying Retail, Wholesale.
147. 597 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
148. See generally United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 597 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
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held some ofthe advances for more than thirty days after the pipeline company
had included the amounts in its rate base: The agency believed that it would
be unreasonable to pass on these costs when the advances had been held by the
producers so long.1
49
The court consideredthe new order as announcing apresumptionthat costs
held over thirty days were unreasonable and struck down its application against
the defendant, concluding that the agency's use of adjudication to impose this
new requirement fell within the Bell Aerospace exception.' The court con-
cluded that retroactive imposition of the ratemaking order would make it
impossible for the operator to recover "substantial... costs" incurred "in
reliance on past Commission decisions."'' Significantly, the court added, with
almost no analysis, that "[w]e cannot help but think that the resulting enormous
yearly losses would hinder the Commission's very purpose for instituting the
[cost recovery] program." 52 Thus, even though the court did not explicitly cite
the Chenery balancing test for retroactive adjudication, it essentially applied it,
balancing the private costs ofretroactivity against the damage to the regulatory
program that would flow from disallowing the retroactivity. In Natural Gas
Pipeline Company ofAmerica v. FERC,"' the Seventh Circuit struck down a
similar order, again based on Bell Aerospace's exception. 5 4 But that court
examined only the injury suffered by the private party's reliance and not the
policy damage that denial of the order's retroactive effect would cause. 55
Another court, in a different factual context, purported to apply the Chenery
balancing test but again only examined the harm done to the private party.
15 6
V Analyzing Agency Adjudication
Boiled down, the appellate court opinions discussed above reflect three
distinct concerns about the propriety of agency decisions to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication. The first, found in the Ninth Circuit rule as it
ultimately developed, relates to inconsistencies in the agency's own conduct;
149. Id. at 584.
150. In support of its view that the agency had established a general presumption and
applied it retroactively, the court noted that the agency had established thirty days as the stand-
ard of reasonableness in every proceeding it decided after a particular date. Id. at 587 n.30.
151. Id.at588.
152. Id. The court did note in a footnote, however, the Commission's own statement of
the purpose of the cost recovery program and an earlier court's understanding of the statute's
overall intention. Id. at 588 n.34.
153. 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
154. See generallyNatural GasPipeLine Co. ofAm. v. FERC, 590 F.2d 664(7th Cir. 1979).
155. Id. at669-70.
156. See Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1347 (8th Cir. 1978) (reversing
retroactive application of NLRB's order).
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namely, recourse to adjudication after the agency already has concluded that
rulemaking is the more appropriate method for deciding a particular issue. The
Ninth Circuit expressed this phenomenon as "circumvention" of the rule-
making process.157 The second concern, most forcefuily expounded by the
Tenth Circuit in First Bancorporation, focuses on the fimctional appropriate-
ness of one procedural vehicle over another."' 5 In First Bancorporation, the
court examined the nature ofthe issue to be decided - namely, whether it was
fact-dependent or a more abstract issue of law or policy - and required the
agency to proceed by rulemaking when the issue seemed more like the latter.159
Finally, courts have considered the unfair retroactivitythat can potentially
result from new legal standards being established and applied in the course of
adjudications. Courts have faced two variants ofthis problem. First, agencies
have sometimes established a legal standard during the course of an adjudica-
tion and attempted to apply that standard to the defendant in that adjudication.
Such retroactive application of a new legal standard makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the defendant to argue effectively that it was in compliance with
a standard whose status as a legal rule was in question until after the adjudica-
tion was over. Second, agencies have simply applied a new rule retroactively.
In this second situation the issue is not such "process unfairness," but instead
the unfairness that arises from retroactive imposition of a new rule.
The previous part of this Article considered each of these concerns in
isolation. This part brings them together, by considering the types of agency
conduct that implicate both the functional and the retroactivity concerns. 16°
The subsequent part then brings in the anti-circumvention idea as part of an
overall evaluation of the jurisprudence and a prescription for change.
A. The Types of Agency Action
The fact that two sets of criteria are operating here - law-changing versus
law-applying and generalized versus particularistic types of issues - means
that agency action can be split into four relevant categories:
law-changing law-applying
generalized 3 2
particularistic 4 1
157. See, e.g., Konishi v. INS, 661 F.2d 818,819 (9th Cir. 1981).
158. See supra Part IVB.1; infra Part V.B.2.
159. See supra Part IV.B.1; infra Part V.2.
160. Because bifurcation of the adjudicative proceeding so easily remedies the "process
unfairness" concern, see supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text, the rest of this Article will
focus instead on situations in which bifurcation cannot cure the unfairness of the retroactivity,
i.e., situations in which it is clear that the defendant has violated the new rule.
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Each combination ofthese characteristics - the nature of the agency action as
law-changing or law-applying (the two columns), and its generalized or fact-
specific focus (the two rows) - carries with it different consequences for the
rulemaking/adjudication decision. This part of the Article considers the four
combinations of these criteria, represented in the above grid as Boxes 1
through 4, and draws some general conclusions about the importance of each
of them to the question of judicial review of the agency's rulemaking/adjudi-
cation decision.
Box 1 can be immediately dismissed as a concern, as it presents a clear
case for allowing an agency to proceed by adjudication. As in BellAerospace,
the agency must make judgments about particular fact patterns that are not
easily generalized, and does so - by hypothesis - by applying settled legal
criteria.' 6 ' This latter fact should mitigate concern about unfair impairment
of reliance interests. Similarly, the fact-dependent nature of the agency's
analysis indicates that the agency is acting appropriately in refraining from
announcing a general rule. Once again an analogy to courts exists, if at a
more abstract level; in this situation the agency adjudicator, like a court, is
dispensing individual justice by applying settled law to the individual's unique
facts. Such action - as opposed to setting forth broad policy applicable to an
entire class of individuals - is quintessentially judicial.162
B. Justifications for an Agency's Choice to Proceed by Adjudication:
Reconsidering Functional Analysis and Retroactivity Concerns
By contrast, Box 3, which presents the exact opposite situation as Box 1,
is troubling. In Box 3, the agency is applying a novel legal principle and its
application does not turn on facts particular to the subject of the adjudication.
Analysis of this situation requires consideration of any agency justifications
for choosing to adjudicate in this situation. In light of these justifications, this
subpart continues by re-examining the functional and retroactivity concerns
introduced earlier.
1. Justifications
Box 3 reflects the situation in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 63 the agency
adjudication that the NLRB purported to use as the basis for the employee
161. See FTC v. Magui Publishers, 9 F.3d 1551 (unpublished table decision), 1993 WL
430102, at *2 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that agency should have proceeded by rulemaking
instead of adjudication When it prosecuted art dealers for misrepresenting authenticity of prints,
on ground that "the present adjudication does not 'changel] existing law' or 'ha[ve] widespread
application'" and that Ford Motor was inapplicable because "the practices the FTC seeks to
forbid... are plainly illegal").
162. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1 (prohibiting states from enacting bills of attainder).
163. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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address-disclosure rule at issue in Wyman-Gordon." TheNLRB's conduct in
Excelsior indicated a lack of concern with the functional factors Chenery
identified as justifying an agency preference for adjudication - the fact-speci-
ficity of the regulatory issue, the agency's need to develop regulatory expertise
before concretizing a principle into a rule, and the unforeseeability of a situa-
tion requiring a rapid agency response.16 First, its decision-making process
and analysis indicated a lack of concern with the nominal defendant's particu-
lar facts. The process included NLRB solicitations of amicus briefs from
employer and union interest groups.1" In its written opinion announcing the
address disclosure principle, the NLRB discussed the requirement in general
terms of the burdens it placed on employers, the benefits it would give to
unions in general, and the logic of requiring the rule given the typical em-
ployer's superior data base of employee residence information.167 By contrast,
the NLRB's discussion included no statements about Excelsior Underwear's
particular situation regarding employee information. Second, the general and
purely prospective application of the address disclosure principle strongly
suggests that the agency was not attempting to develop its regulatory power
incrementally by imposing a requirement on a particular party and then observ-
ing how it actually worked in practice. Finally, the process suggests that the
agency was not responding to an unforeseen situation that required an agency
response. On the contrary, the agency's conduct reflects a measured, calcu-
lated initiative careful to take into account the interests and perspectives of all
interested parties, whose result did not even apply to past conduct.
But even without these justifications, an agency may still attempt to
justify its preference for adjudication on the ground that it needs to apply the
new principle retroactively, given that it is at best unclear whether agencies
have inherent authority to impose regulations retroactively."es Of course, this
justification was not available to the agency in Excelsior because the agency
applied the result only prospectively. But assume that, unlike in Excelsior, an
agency justifies its preference for adjudication on the need to apply the result
retroactively. If, as Chenery teaches, 69 the justification for retroactive action
164. See supra Part HII.B (discussing Wyman-Gordon).
165. See text accompanying supra note 47 (quoting Chenery).
166. See Excelor, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1237.
167. See id. at 1240-47.
168. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For samples of the academic literature on this question, see generally William V.
Luneburg, Retroactivity andAdministrative Rulemaking, 1991 DuK L.J. 106, and Richard .
WoM Note, Judicial Review ofRetroactive Rulemaking: Has Georgetown Neglected the Plastic
Remedies?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 157 (1990).
169. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194,203 (1947) (ruling that courts must balance
burden of retroactive law-changing .against "mischief" agency sought to remedy by such law-
changing in determining constitutionality of retroactive agency action).
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is the "mischief' that would occur absent retroactive application, but the case
lacks Chenery's justifications for resorting to adjudication, it should be harder
for the agency to defend piecemeal imposition of the new rule. In other
words, if functionally the regulatory situation does not require adjudication,
the "mischief-abatement" ground for retroactivity might seem less compelling
because such piecemeal conduct by its nature may not be particularly effective
in abating the mischief. 70
It should not be enough for an agency to respond to this argument by
saying that retroactive piecemeal adjudication is the best it can do given a lack
of statutory authorization to promulgate retroactive regulations. The lack of
statutory authorization is not an unchangeable feature of the legal landscape;
instead, Congress can authorize agencies to promulgate retroactive regula-
tions.171 Like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark, the Congress that does
not authorize retroactive agency regulations, especially after Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital required that such authority be granted
explicitly,'72 should be acknowledged in its silence." 3 To allow agencies to
impose piecemeal retroactive burdens on the theory that piecemeal retroactiv-
ity is better than none at all, thus short-circuiting Chenery's balancing test,
would deny Congress's role in ultimately setting the limits of agency conduct.
It may be even more inappropriate for the agency to answer the concern
about piecemeal imposition of retroactive burdens by imposing the adjudi-
cative result generally, either informally or through an aggressive enforcement
program. In Ford Motor, the Ninth Circuit was concerned about precisely this
possi'bility: In that case, the FTC was preparing to notify auto dealers
throughout the nation of the result of the adjudication, presumably to induce
general compliance with the principle emerging from it. To allow the agency
to surmount the Chenery retroactivity balancing test by asserting that the
170. It is true that sometimes an agency adjudication may be quicker than a rulemaking.
See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 607 (1992) (noting EPA estimate that initial preparation to promulgation of major
rule takes average of three and one half years). On the other hand, an adjudication does not
cause every party in the affected industry to comply automatically, instead, there may be a
significant delay while the agency publicizes the adjudicative result and sets forth its position
regarding the binding nature of the adjudication on the rest of the industry. Thus, adjudication
may at least sometimes be the longer, less expeditious route of effectuating industry compliance
with a given standard.
171. See Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 208.
172. See id. at 208 (requiring express statement before courts may construe statutes to
authorize agency to promulgate retroactive regulations).
173. Distinguish the controversial practice of inferring meaning from legislative silence.
See Peter Tiersma, The Language ofSilence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 92 (1995) (noting disagree-
ment among commentators and courts on meaning properly accorded legislative silence). See
generally David L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 375 (1992). In this situation, the default presumption is that silence confers no authority
to promulgate retroactive regulations.
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retroactive effect ofthe adjudication was not limited to the litigation target but
was generally applicable would allow the agency to accomplish by indirection
what Congress is presumed to have not approved of- promulgating a gener-
ally applicable retroactive regulation. Such conduct would constitute circum-
vention, not of the rulemaking process per se, but of Congress's limitations on
the scope of administrative regulations.
Thus, approaching the matter from a strictly policy perspective, there
appear to be few justifications for agency use of adjudication in this situation.
The rationales noted by Chenery do not apply, and the need for retroactivity
should be considered lessened to the extent that Congress has not given the
agency the authority to issue retroactive regulations, even after Georgetown
established explicit legislative authorization as a requirement. Nevertheless,
the fact that the agency has a weak case for preferring adjudication in this
situation does not necessarily justify courts in striking down the agency's
choice. Even if there is no rationale affirmatively justifying the agency's
choice, the agency still may be able to argue that its choice was not so irrational
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. The analysis of whether the agency's
choice does in fact constitute an abuse of discretion should address the two
issues to which this discussion now turns. First, is there a workable rule for
determining when adjudication is not only not a good idea, but affirmatively
a bad one? Second, what harm does an agency's inappropriate choice cause?
The next subpart of this Article considers these questions in the context of the
Tenth Circuit's functional analysis in First Bancorporation,"4 while the
subsequent subpart considers them against the backdrop of the fair notice-
retroactivity concern.
175
2. First Bancorporation Reconsidered
The search for a workable rule should begin with First Bancorporation.
As noted earlier, the FirstBancorporation approach asks whether the agency's
analysis in the adjudication turned on facts specific to the defendant or
whether instead it relied on generally applicable policy concerns.'76 Conclud-
ing that the agency had not considered such particularized facts, the court held
the agency's action to constitute an abuse of discretion. Thus, if we assume
away any reliance concerns that might implicate retroactivity analysis, we can
analyze First Bancorporation as presenting the situation in Box 2, law apply-
ing in a non-fact specific context. So understood, First Bancorporation
squarely raises the question whether this sort of functional analysis, divorced
from any concerns about retroactivity, can provide a tool for judicial control
of an agency's choice between adjudication and rulemaking.
174. See infra Part V.B.2.
175. See infra Part VB.3.
176. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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Although heavily criticized,"7 First Bancorporation employs an analysis
used in the important procedural due process cases from the early twentieth
century. Those foundational cases, Londoner v. Denver" and BiMetallic
Investment Co. v. State Board ofEqualization,179 together established the law
for when the due process right to a hearing applied.180 In BiMetallic, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, rejected a due process
claim brought by a landowner who wished to contest a state agency decision
to revalue, for property tax purposes, every parcel of taxable land in a
county.' In rejecting the claim that the Constitution gave the landowner the
right to a hearing, the Court distinguished Londoner, in which the Court stated
that due process required a hearing when a bill for city improvements was
assessed against landowners presumed to have benefitted from the improve-
ments. The BiMetallic Court distinguished Londoner as follows:
In Londoner... [a] relatively small number of persons was concerned,
who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds,
and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. But that decision is far
fromreaching ageneral determination dealing only withtheprinciple upon
which all the assessments in a county had been laid."
Thus, in order to determine whether a party had a due process hearing right,
the BiMetallic Court examined the sort of facts at issue (i.e., were the parties
"affected... upon individual grounds")."s Commentators seeking to explain
and justify the Londoner/B iMetallic distinction have noted and expanded upon
this functional analysis, 8 4 and modem courts have looked explicitly to the
"adjudicative" or "policy" character of the issue when confronted with claims
that an agency should have proceeded by adjudication instead ofrulemaking. 85
An obvious distinction betweentheLondonerlBiMetallic analysis and the
analysis in First Bancorporation lies in the right at issue: Londoner and
BiMetallic decided claims of constitutional right, while First Bancorporation
simply decided a sub-constitutional issue of administrative procedure. While
177. See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1, 63 (1985); Russell L. Weaver, ChallengingRegulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
109, 146-47(1991).
178. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
179. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
180. See generally BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
181. See Bifetallic, 239 U.S. at445-46.
182. Id.
183. Id. at446.
184. See 2 DAvIs& PIERCE, supra note 15, § 9.2; see also William D. Araiza, The Trouble
with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory
Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATIf U. L. REV. 1055 (1999).
185. See infra note 204.
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due process requires an adjudicatory hearing if an agency acts in a targeted
way against a particular party, the due process guarantee does not speak to the
situation in First Bancorporation, where the claim was that the agency should
have proceeded by some means other than an adjudicatory hearing. The
different source of those rights may well justify greater judicial deference to
agency discretion than if the rights emanated from the Constitution. The
government may not impair constitutional rights, as fundamental limits on
governmental action, simply by labeling its action in a way so as ostensibly
to avoid the constitutional problem. For example, a legislature cannot pro-
nounce an individual guilty of a crime and deny the individual a trial on the
ground that the action was legislative instead of adjudicative,"8 6 nor can it
effectively take private property simply by decreeing that it is not private
property at all'87 Thus, the BiMetallic Court did not stop at the government's
own characterization of such action, but instead compared the characteristics
of that action with those in Londoner. By contrast, the right to participate in
an administrative rulemaking does not exist independently of the government
action - that is, the right does not attach until an agency is in fact conducting
a rulemaking. Unless there is something intrinsically important about that
right - i.e., unless there is something about it so important that it should drive
courts to conclude that the agency is in fact conducting a rulemaking - the
existence of the rulemaking participation rights should not be used as a boot-
strap for a judicial conclusion that the right applies in a given case.
Rulemaking participation rights certainly are not trivial. Agency use of
adjudication to establish a rule may well deprive subsequent defendants of any
meaningful participation right for at least two reasons. First, while agency
adjudications are subject to procedural requirements imposed by the Due
Process Clause, this right may not mean much if the statutory scheme autho-
rizes the agency to collect substantial fines or damages from individuals who
violate the rule.'88 For example, in FordMotor the Ninth Circuit noted that
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I (prohibiting states from enacting bills of attainder);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring injudgment) (concluding that
legislative veto overturning agency's suspension of particular named individuals' deportations
constituted unconstitutional attempt by Congress to exercise judicial powers).
187. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980)
(holding that state took private property when it deemed private funds deposited in court-
supervised account to be "public money," concluding that "a State, by ipse dixit, may not
transform private property into public property without compensation"). Still, the Takings
Clause presents a difficult application of this principle because the state initially defines
property. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-35 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing concept of property as expectation interests,
which are in turn inevitably created by governments). A similar problem arises in the area of
procedural due process, when the inquiry turns to whether the government action has impaired
a property interest. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
188. Imposition of such fines would not implicate reliance-retroactivity concerns because
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the agency was in the process of preparing a letter to every other car dealer in
the country, notifying them of the result of the agency adjudication."8 9 If the
statute had authorized the agency to assess penalties for statutory violations,
such a "notification" might serve as a not-so-subtle signal to the industry to
conform with the result of that adjudication, lest the agency pursue them and
seek fines for ongoing non-compliance."9 While such fines might rise to the
level of a due process violation if they effectively precluded an opportunity
to challenge the agency's interpretation of the law,191 the contours of that
guarantee are not certain ' and leave open the real possibility that parties
effectively will be precluded from a chance to challenge the policy wisdom
of the rule that the agency seeks to apply.
Second, even if a party thus is not precluded from challenging the rule
when it has its turn before the agency, the presumption in favor of the rule
enshrined in the precedent means that there will be less opportunity to con-
vince the agency that its rule constitutes unwise policy. Under current law,
an agency cannot depart from principles announced in prior adjudication
unless it explains why it changed its mind. 93 The institutional and possibly
political cost that an agency faces when considering a change of position,
combined with the requirement that such a change survive an extra, sometimes
unpredictable, and possibly quite rigorous"" layer of judicial review, likely
these subsequent defendants would most likely be held to have been on notice of the existence
of the rule from the prior adjudication. Indeed, as noted, the agency might even notify other
members of the industry of the result of the first litigation as well as the rule thereby established.
See infra note 189 and accompanying text
189. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
190. For a more general discussion of such informal agency pressure, see generally Lars
Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations ofAuthority,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 873.
191. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,147 (1908) (holding that statutory scheme violates
due process "when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment
so severe as to intimidate [the private party] from resorting to the courts to test the validity of
the legislation").
192. See, e.g., Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing
scope ofExparte Young); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986) (same);
Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (same); see also J. Wylie Donald,
DefendingAgainstDailyFinesandPunitiveDamages UnderCERCLA: TheMeaningof"Wih-
outSufficientCause," 19 COLUMJ J.ENVTh.L. 185,196-206 (1994) (analyzing scope ofExparte
Young).
193. See infra notes 194 & 233.
194. Cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42
(1983) (invalidating National Highway Transportation Safety Board's reversal of its previous
requirement that automakers install airbags or passive safety devices as arbitrary and capri-
cious). The Court stated that
Revocation [of a regulation] constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views as
to the proper course. A "settled course of behavior embodies the agency's informed
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places at least a finger on the side of the scale favoring adherence to past
precedent. By contrast, the notice and comment rulemaking process allows
any and all interested parties to participate in the shaping of regulatory policy
before the agency has committed itself.
Despite these problems with agency adjudication, First Bancorporation's
limit on agency discretion to choose adjudication presents problems of its
own. Notwithstanding the Londoner/BiMetallic distinction, the line between
actions that "look like adjudicating" and those that "look like legislating" is
sufficiently vague as to make it impossible to conclude that an agency abused
its discretion in doing one but calling it another. For example, courts very
often decide abstract issues of law that have little to do with the facts of
particular parties before them. Constitutional or statutory interpretation is
often of this sort. To take an obvious example, the particular situation of the
plaintiff in Roe v. Wade"'5 probably had little effect on the Supreme Court's
analysis ofthe constitutional right to an abortion. 96 In fairness, federal courts
nevertheless require that their power not be invoked except at the behest of
particular parties who have been injured and who require judicial assistance
in vindicating a right." But even though agency courts are not subject to the
same Article HI standing requirements, agency adjudication effectively
satisfies a standing-like requirement when the agency, on behalf of the gov-
ernment, alleges that a particular party has violated federal law.l" Even ifthe
agency adjudication solely establishes a rule of conduct that then will apply
generally to all parties, the concrete adversarial nature of the agency's en-
forcement action makes the agency adjudication just as inherently judicial as
a test case litigated in a court.199
judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to
it by Congress. There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies will be
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to."
Id. (citations omitted).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). One should note, though, that the particular
party's situation might have much to do with 'whether the court will feel obligated to reach a
given legal issue. It is for this reason that advocates seeking to advance an agenda broader than
their particular clients' immediate interests often pick their cases carefully. But once a court
decides that a particular plaintiff's claims require a decision on a broader statutory or constitu-
tional issue, the plaintiffis particular facts tend to become less important
197. See, e.g., Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982) (discussing this concern in standing doctrine).
198. A more interesting Article II-type question is whether purely prospective adjudicative
relief makes an agency adjudication akin to an advisory opinion. See infa Part V.C.
199. Indeed, to take the analogy further, sometimes legislation looks suspiciously like
adjudication. The Supreme Court attempted to demarcate a line between "legislation" and
adjudication of individual cases in the famously opaque case of UnitedStates v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128 (1872). The line Klein draws has proven anything but clear. See Araiza, supra
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Of course, courts have other, more pragmatic, reasons for limiting
judicial action to concrete, live disputes. Such adversarial conflicts sharpen
presentations of the issues, enhance a court's understanding of the effects its
decisions will have on private parties, and generally increase the quality of
judicial decision-making.2" But once again these rationales also apply to
agency adjudication. If the agency has the authority to use either rulemaking
or adjudication but concludes that its decision-making will be enhanced by a
sharply adversarial presentation ofthe legal issues and the presence of parties
that the agency's action will immediately affect, it makes sense to allow the
agency to choose adjudication. For example, Chenery itself stated that it was
appropriate for an agency to rely on adjudication when it needed to develop
more experience with a statute before promulgating generally applicable bind-
ing regulations.2°" In the same vein, in a Tenth Circuit case that distinguished
First Bancorporation, the court authorized an agency to deviate in a particular
case from general penalty guidelines the agency had developed, based on the
agency's statement that the guidelines should be expected to evolve as the
agency gained expertise in administering the statute.2"
Thus, an agency's use of adjudication to enunciate a generally applicable
rule without reference to the litigant's particular facts - the situation in First
Bancorporation - mirrors in substantial degree activities undertaken by
courts. This conclusion suggests that it is difficult to condemn the agency's
conduct in such situations on a purely functional basis. At base, the line
between adjudication and legislation is simply too porous to rely on such
functional terminology as the basis for holding that an agency's use of adjudi-
cation was inappropriate. The fact that courts review the agency's adjudi-
cation/ulemaking choice only for abuse of discretion buttresses this conclu-
sion.2"3 The APA drafters' choice of this relatively lenient standard suggests
that rulemaking participation rights are not so important relative to the alterna-
note 184, at 1073-79 (discussing how courts and commentators have attempted to understand
Klein). InRobertson v. SeattleAudubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), the Court upheld, against
a Klein challenge, an appropriations rider that directed courts to find that certain government
actions satisfied statutes alleged to have been violated in cases identified in the rider. As a result
of Klein, Congress can go a long way toward micro-legislating without crossing the line into the
adjudication of cases. For a more detailed discussion of Klein, Robertson, and the problem of
legislative interference with the judicial function, see generally Araiza, supra note 184.
200. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 (discussing rationale for standing requirement);
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1080-81 (Ohio
1999) (same).
201. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,203 (1947).
202. See Rapp v. Department of Treasury, 52 F.3d 1510, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1995).
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (setting forth APA's standards of review); see also Chen-
ery, 332 U.S. at 202-03 (identifying abuse of discretion as appropriate standard of review prior
to drafting of APA).
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tive that parties have rights to participate in their own adjudications so as to
justify stringent judicial policing of the hazy distinction between adjudication
and legislation, at least when constitutional rights are not at stake.2°4
This conclusion does not mean that an agency is thereby free to use
adjudication whenever it chooses. Since the APA distinguishes between rules
and adjudicative orders, it should be read as imposing some limits on the
agency's ability to choose. But rather than approaching the issue from the
point of the view of the character of the decision - i.e., the functional ap-
proach in First Bancorporation - it may make more sense to approach the
question from the point of view of the private party rights that the agency's
choice implicates. Indeed, the above discussion suggests that the nature of the
right involved may distinguish First Bancorporation from BiMetallic.
The most important private party right that the agency's choice of adjudi-
cation implicates is the right to fair notice of the law. An agency's retroactive
application of a new rule implicates that right. Because most agency retroac-
tivity results from adjudication, this Article now considers the problem posed
by retroactive application of a new rule via agency adjudication.
3. Reconsidering the Retroactivity Problem
ComparedtoFirstBancorporation's functional analysis, the retroactivity
concern presents both a stronger reason to be concerned about an agency's
choice to proceed by adjudication and more hope for judicial limits to protect
private interests.
First, the retroactivity concern protects private party rights that always
have been considered quite weighty. In contrast to the functional concern,
which only protects a version of the participation rights that the APA guaran-
tees, the retroactivity issue implicates rights of constitutional magnitude. The
Supreme Court has identified several important principles implicated by legis-
lative retroactivity, including protection of reliance interests,20 5 interests in
204. Indeed, cases in which the private party alleges the opposite - that an agency engaged
in rulemaking when it should have adjudicated - do appear to feature less deferential review,
even if the results still tend to favor the agency's choice. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598
F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting such claim in context of Clean Water Act, based on
court's conclusion that issues decided in rulemaking "require[d] EPA to consider issues of
general policy with respect to a pollutant, i.e., the significance of its toxicity, degradability,
persistence, and effects on affected organisms, rather than issues of fact concerning any partic-
ular entity's discharges"); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646; 660-61 (1st Cir. 1974)
(distinguishing between adjudicative facts and legislative facts); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
482 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973) (approving agency's use of public hearing). Signifi-
cantly, this less deferential review arises exactly when the claim made - that an agency should
have adjudicated instead of doing rulemaking - has constitutional overtones.
205. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,547-49 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment and dissenting in part); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191
(1992); Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,16-17 (1976).
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"finality and repose,""' and concern about the inappropriate singling out that
is possible when legislation burdens a discrete class of individuals that can be
identified with precision."° Concern with retroactivity also fits comfortably
within the broad outlines of constitutional limitations ongovernment. The con-
cem for reliance animates constitutional jurisprudence ranging fromprocedural
due process2" to the Takings 9 and Contracts210 Clauses. The singling out
concern finds expression in a variety of constitutional guarantees, including the
Ex Post Facto,211 Bill of Attainder,212 and Equal Protection13 Clauses.
214
Second, there is a history ofjudicial experimentation with and applica-
tion of principles designed to detect inappropriate retroactivity. The appellate
courts developing and applying the Retail, Wholesale test215 have created a
nuanced test that expands upon the basic Chenery balancing test for judging
agency retroactivity. Periodic Supreme Court cases analyzing the test by
which courts analyze legislative retroactivity have complimented this effort.
216
Together, these cases reflect a workable judicial standard for measuring the
appropriateness of agency retroactivity.
This is not to suggest that analysis of the retroactivity concern is simple
or mechanical. Indeed, the few cases to have analyzed the adjudication/rule-
206. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 37-38 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
207. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,266-67 (1994) (discussing presump-
tion against finding statute to have retroactive effect); see also Charles B. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the ConstitutionaliOy ofRetroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692,693
(1960) (stating that retroactive laws "may be passed with an exact knowledge of who will
benefit from [them]"). Justices Breyer and Powell have located concern about such singling out
in the Constitution's general structure of separated power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514
U.S. 211,240 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). For a deeper examination of these Breyer and
Powell opinions, see Araiza, supra note 184, at 1092-95 & 1099-1101.
208. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discussing reliance basis
underlying legal understandings of concept of property).
209. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding
that property interest does not exist, and thus no taking occurs, when legal principles extant in
jurisdiction at time owner acquires property would have supported limitation on use whose later
denial allegedly constitutes taking); Penn Cent Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (identifying degree of interference with investment-backed expectation interests
as factor in determining whether taking has occurred).
210. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,245 (1978) (highlighting
unusually severe impact on reliance interests of statute impacting pension funding obligations).
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
212. U.S. CONST. art. , § 9, cl. 3 & art.L ,§ 10, cl. 1.
213. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
214. See generally Araiza, supra note 184.
215. Retail, Wholesale &Dep't Store Union v. NLRB,466 F.2d 380,390 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
216. See supra notes 205-07.
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making issue in terms of Chenery's balancing test indicate the problems that
can occur. Recall, for example, the pipeline rate base cases in which the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits relied on Bell Aerospace to reverse the agency's choice
to proceed by adjudication.21 In Natural Gas Pipeline, the Seventh Circuit
struck down the agency's use of retroactive adjudication based simply on the
size of the retroactive monetary liability.218 Moreover, the court's conclusion
as to the size of that liability appeared to be ad hoc, without any reference
either to the scale of defendant's operations or some other relevant comparative
factor.21
9
The problem is that many, perhaps most, agency adjudications will
impose liability on the private party. If that alone is enough to make retroac-
tively imposed liability suspect, then the Bell Aerospace exception becomes
much wider than courts - and even Bell Aerospace itself - appear to have
supposed. Such analysis is flatly inconsistent with Chenery, which required
that the courts balance the burden on the private party against the mischief the
agency sought to remedy with retroactive application of the new rule. The
logical conclusion of such a bizarre jurisprudence is reflected in a Fourth
Circuit case where a dissenting judge argued that the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission should not be allowed to announce and to apply
a new rule in an adjudication because imposition of that new rule had resulted
in the private party being fined a total of two dollars." °
Even when these courts considered the substantive rationality of the
agency retroactivity decision, they sometimes have failed to give that issue
sufficiently careful analysis. Consider the other pipeline case discussed
earlier, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United Gas." In that case the court
condemned the agency's thirty-day presumption because it failed to promote
the statutory objective of encouraging domestic gas production. m Thus, in
217. See supra Part IV.B..b.
218. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing Natural Gas Pipeline).
219. Compare supra Part IV.B.2.b with United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32-33
(1994) (considering constitutionality of statute's retroactive effects, and framing relevant issue
as scope, not size, of statute's retroactive effect), Laborer's Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 393 (3d Cir. 1994) (comparing amount of retroactive liability to
estimated litigation expenses of challenging it), and J3L. Foti Const. Co. v. OSHA, 687 F.2d
853, 858-59 (6th Cir. 1982) (considering magnitude increase in penalty due to retroactive
application of new standard). See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 548-49 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (finding Carlton factor satisfied
based on challenged statute's creation of "liability for events which occurred 35 years ago").
220. See Sewell Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 686 F.2d
1066, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (Widener, J., dissenting).
221. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 597 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
222. See text accompanying supra notes 147-52 (discussing facts and court's analysis in
United Gas).
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Chenery's terms, the court simply decided that retroactive application of the
thirty-day presumption did not promote the goals of the regulatory program,
but actually impeded them. So understood, United Gas and cases like it m
implicitly conclude that there is nothing to balance: retroactivity both pro-
duced harm to the private party and impeded attainment of the statutory
objective. But if this were really the court's conclusion, one would have
expected a more in-depth discussion of the policy repercussions of the agency
retroactivity. Instead, the analysis is breathtakingly quick. For example, the
United Gas court's entire textual discussion of the agency's policy consisted
of the conclusion that "[w]e cannot help but think that the resulting enormous
yearly losses would hinder the Commission's very purpose for instituting the
[cost recovery] program." 4  Fundamental tenets of judicial deference to
administrative expertise and judgment require careful review of the agency's
rationale - rather than the cursory analysis seen in these cases - before the
agency action can be struck down as irrational.'
Nevertheless, this sort ofmisanalysis is not the result of a fundamentally
unmanageable rule. As noted above, both the appellate courts and the Su-
223. See, e.g., Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1977). In Drug
Package, the Eighth Circuit struck down retroactive application of a rule announced by the
NLRB after labor and management in the Drug Package case had performed all the relevant
actions. Id. at 1346. The court based its refusal to impose retroactive liability on two grounds.
First, it found that the company had relied on the prior NLRB rule. Id. at 1347. Second, it
found, without analyzing the issue, that retroactive application of the new rule to Drug Package
would "accomplish[ ] none of the benefits contemplated in" the adjudication in which the
agency changed the rule. Id. For a similar, though better reasoned, example of a court conclud-
ing that retroactive application of a new principle frustrated regulatory policy and thus left
nothing to balance, see McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1046 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Retail, Wholesale test).
224. United Gas, 597 F,2d at 588. The court did note in a footnote, however, the Commis-
sion's own statement of the purpose of the cost recovery program, as well as an earlier court's
understanding of the statute's overall intention. See id. at 588 n.34. For a similarly cursory
analysis, see supra note 223 (discussing DrugPackage).
225. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(finding agency action arbitrary and capricious after considering whether agency had considered
relevant statutory standards or committed clear error of judgment). It should be noted that
courts applying the similar Retail, Wholesale test have decided to apply the test on a de novo
basis, with no deference to the agency. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141, 1144 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't
Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380,390 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While there is an argument for less
deference to an agency when what is at stake is a constitutional right such as the due process
right to be free of arbitrary retroactivity, that position must be balanced against the inescapable
fact that the agency will best understand how to effectuate regulatory policies. Thus, while there
may be a good argument for de novo application of other parts of the Retail, Wholesale test,
there is a weaker argument for such review of the agency's determination that retroactivity is
necessary in order to implement a given regulatory policy.
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preme Court have provided a great deal of guidance in the enunciation and
sensitive application of a test to measure administrative retroactivity. Prob-
lems such as those in the pipeline cases can be viewed as simple misappli-
cations of a rule, an easily correctable situation. For example, some courts
applying the Retail, Wholesale test have managed to consider retroactivity in
a much more nuanced way. 26 Thus, the retroactivity concern provides both
a reason to be concerned about agency adjudication and a method to police
inappropriate agency uses of adjudication. But the anti-retroactivity principle
threatens to collide with one of the main reasons to allow agencies to adjudi-
cate, a reason that all agree is legitimate: a case where the proper outcome
depends on the facts of the particular litigant. This Article now turns to that
situation.
C. Prospective Agency Adjudication and the Importance of Facts
Box 4 represents the situation where a novel principle is being established,
but - unlike in Excelsior and Ford Motor - the subject matter at issue is not
susceptible to generalized treatment. BellAerospace presents this situation. 7
In Bell Aerospace, the agency considered a unionization request made by a
group of corporate purchasers. The agency concluded that they were eligible
for federal unionization protection, applying a two-year old reinterpretation of
the NLRA to the effect that even some managerial employees could be repre-
sented by a union.' The Supreme Court reversed the agency's statutory
interpretation and read the statute so as to exclude "managerial employees"
from its union organizing rights. The Court then remanded the case to the
agency for it to determine whether the purchasers were in fact "managerial
employees." It also made it clear that the agency could proceed by adjudication
if it chose. According to the Court, the diversity of fact patterns facing the
agency meant that the agency justified a case-by-case approach because those
differing fact patterns were crucial to the agency's analysis." 9
226. See supra note 219 (citing cases considering Retail, Wholesale test); see also Mc-
Donald, 653 F.2d at 1043-46.
227. For a more detailed statement of BellAerospace's facts, see supra Part lII.C.
228. The term "managerial employee" is not mentioned in the statute, but became signifi-
cant only after the NLRB itself developed a jurisprudence in which unionization rights turned
on that term, which the agency coined based on its interpretation of the statute. See NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267,275-77 (1974).
229. See BellAerospace, 416 U.S. at 294. The Court stated:
As the Court ofAppeals noted, "[t]here must be tens of thousands of manufacturing,
wholesale and retail units which employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the
latter." 475 F.2d at 496. Moreover, duties of buyers vary widely depending on the
company or industry. It is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be
framed which would have more than marginal utility. The Board thus has reason to
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While a case such as Bell Aerospace thus presents a strong functional
argument for adjudication, the use of adjudication nevertheless potentially
conflicts with the retroactivity concern. This problem did not arise in Bell
Aerospace, as the Court concluded that the reliance interests were not "so
substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the issue
in an adjudicative proceeding."" 0 But what if that reliance had in fact been
substantial? If the balance between those reliance interests and the mischief
that retroactive application of the new rule mitigated had favored non-retroac-
tivity, what course would have been left to the agency?
Assuming both the necessity of proceeding by adjudication and the strong
reliance interests, the obvious solution to the problem is for the agency to use
adjudication but to apply the result only prospectively. But this suggestion
immediately encounters the objection that pure prospectivity converts adjudi-
cation into de facto rulemaking. 1 Because any solution must be consistent
with the APA's basic distinction between adjudication and rulemaking,
adjudicative prospectivity is vulnerable to the extent that retroactivity and
prospectivity define the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking. This
Article suggests that a deeper understanding of adjudication - when combined
with the unique features of agency action - justifies allowing an agency to
apply an adjudicative result prospectively, but only when the adjudicative
resultturns onthe particular facts ofthe party before the agency court. Inthose
instances, the fact-intensive nature ofthe issue mitigates the legislative charac-
ter of purely prospective agency adjudication. At the same time, limiting
agency adjudicative prospectivity to fact-intensive contexts allows the agency
to choose adjudication in the situations Chenery identifies as justifying that
procedure without allowing the agency's discretion to spill over into situations
in which the adjudication would become de facto rulemaking.
First, fact-intensiveness makes a decision less abstract and thus more like
classic adjudication. Indeed, a fact-intensive adjudicatory decision, prospec-
tively applied, starts to look like an injunction because it judges the legality of
the party's prior conduct and directly controls its future conduct. To the extent
that the rule established is fact specific, it mitigates the objection that pure
prospectivity refocuses the agency action away from the specific target of the
litigation and toward the class of similarly situated parties. Arguing for
proceed with caution, developing its standards in a case-by-ease manner with atten-
tion to the specific character ofthe buyers' authority and duties in each company.
Id.
230. Id. at 295.
231. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,216 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that APA clearly distinguishes administrative regulations from agency
adjudicative orders in that regulations have only prospective effect while adjudicative orders
have "future as well as past legal consequences").
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adjudicative prospectivity, another commentator makes an analogous point,
noting that the defendant in the litigation that produced the prospectively
applied rule would most likely remain affected by that decision as a member
of the class whose future conduct the rule impacted. 2 The limitation on
adjudicative prospectivity suggested here merely goes one step further, requir-
ing that the rule's direct impact be limited to that particular party.
Second, this type of adjudicatory prospectivity allows for participation
rights that distinguish those adjudications from regulations. Again, the key
lies in the fact-intensiveness of the adjudication. Just like a common-law
decision, a fact-dependent agency adjudication can always be distinguished
in the next case on the ground that the new facts are sufficiently different to
justify a different result. This feature thus limits adjudicatory prospectivity
to situations in which subsequent targets have a meaningful participation
right, i.e., the right to distinguish their facts from those of the precedent case.
By contrast, purely prospective application of a more general principle,
such as the address disclosure rule in Excelsior, resembles legislation pre-
cisely because it does not depend on the defendant's unique facts and thus
does not afford a realistic participation right to subsequent defendants. Of
course, a defendant in an enforcement action brought after Excelsior would
still have a right to a hearing, but since the relevant rule does not turn on the
particular defendant's own facts, the only argument available to such a defen-
dant is that the rule is simply bad policy. That argument, however, is not
made against a blank slate, for agency adjudications are presumptively bind-
ing unless the agency explains why it has decided to deviate from its previous
policy."3 A subsequent defendant also faces the hurdle of arguing against a
rule that the agency already has considered and decided to adopt, with all the
attendant institutional biases against reversing a publicly-announced course.
A subsequent defendant confronted with these significant hurdles must also
factor in the possibility of fines or penalties accruing during the litigation
period." 4 Thus, when the agency prospectively applies a generally applicable
rule such as the Excelsior rule, the result is very much akin to the result when
an agency promulgates a regulation: in both cases, members of the affected
class face significant pressure to comply.
232. See Greene, supra note 145, at 298.
233. Indeed, in such a situation the agency would have the burden ofjustifying a deviation
from its prior rule. See, e.g., Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Local 32, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 774 F.2d 498, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,852 (1970)). Although this might also
be the case with a fact-specific adjudicatory rule, the task of distinguishing would be signifi-
cantly easier the more fact-specific the original rule was.
234. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (explaining how agency-imposed fines
pressure litigants).
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This does not suggest that allowing limited adjudicative prospectivity
magically solves the problem of guarding private party participation rights.
Under this proposal, agencies would continue to have the power to enunciate
general rules via adjudication, with all the attendant concern for the participa-
tion rights of subsequent litigants, as long as the agency applied those rules
retroactively (consistent with the Chenery balancing test). The point of allow-
ing limited prospective adjudication is not to solve that difficult problem, at
least not conclusively."5 Instead, the point is to show how such limited
prospective adjudication solves the problem of unfair retroactivity while still
keeping adjudication analytically distinct from rulemaking. The retroactivity
problem is solved, of course, by allowing prospectivity. Adjudication remains
distinct from rulemaking because it retains a core attribute of traditional
adjudication - a focus on case-by-case consideration of individual parties'
particular facts.
Finally, this approach to prospective adjudication - that it is appropriate
when applied to a fact-specific context - also justifies prospectivity when the
agency's rationale for choosing adjudication is that it needs experience
applying the statute before it feels comfortable solidifying the requirement
into a general regulation. As Chenery noted, such a situation clearly justifies
agency use of adjudication." 6 But when the Chenery balance would not allow
retroactivity based on such a "learning curve" rationale, the adjudicative
results can be applied prospectively on the theory that such adjudication is, in
its own way, fact-intensive. Specificaly, imposition of a mandate via an
adjudication allows the agency to observe how the rule operates in practice,
that is, how it operates in the context of the defendant's specific facts. Partic-
ularized facts once again become important, not necessarily as inputs into the
decision to impose the rule, but instead as prospective indicators of the rule's
effectiveness and wisdom. 7
235. In a way, though, limited adjudicatory prospectivity does in fact solve the problem.
If satisfaction of the Chenery test implies a conclusion that the public need outweighs private
parties' reliance interests, public need may also outweigh private parties' rights to a meaningful
hearing when the agency applies the rule against them. Obviously, the formal right to a hearing
would always remain, but it is assumed that such a hearing is less meaningful when (1) the rule
is based on general policy concerns, (2) there is a presumption against the agency changing its
mind on the general policy wisdom of the rule, see supra note 233, and (3) the agency could
threaten to assess non-compliance fines during the litigation period, see supra notes 190-92.
But at least the right to a hearing would remain, and that right might be enough to conclude that
there is no "participation right" problem when the Chenery test allows retroactivity.
236. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,202-03 (1947).
237. As an operational rule, this principle would require courts to inquire whether the
agency is planning on imposing the same rule throughout the industry before examining the
effect of the rule on a limited number of parties. For the agency to engage in such selective
testing of its rule would cause obvious unfairness problems of the agency imposing different
AGFNCYADJUDICATION
So understood, allowing prospective adjudication when the outcome is
fact-dependent provides room for the agency to choose adjudication in all the
situations Chenery identified as justifying adjudicationF5 while it simulta-
neously honors legitimate reliance interests. The first Chenery justification -
the fact specificity of the regulatory issue - is satisfied by definition. The
"learning curve" rationale also is satisfied, once that rationale is understood
as speaking to the agency's need to observe the interplay of its tentative
regulatory approach and the facts of a given party's business operations.
Finally, the agency's need to respond to unforeseen circumstances presumably
means that, absent extraordinarily strong reliance interests, the private burden-
public mischief balance for agency retroactivity will favor retroactive applica-
tion of the rule, thus obviating the need to worry about prospective adjudica-
tion. Moreover, limited prospectivity honors the fundamental difference
between adjudication and legislation and the participation rights that-attend
each of those."9 It therefore manages to address both the retroactivity and
functional concerns discussed above.
The rule also is judicially manageable. Unlike First Bancorporation's
approach, it manages to avoid most instances of courts having to second guess
the functional appropriateness of fact-based specificity or policy-based
generality because it applies only when retroactive application would cause
constitutional concerns. There would still be some need for judicial consider-
burdens on similarly situated parties. However, the only way to mitigate this concern would be
for the agency to apply the rule to all similarly situated industry members. If that is what it
does, however, then the agency is not really acting tentatively by testing a rule before turning
it into a regulation. Instead, its conduct looks much more like simple circumvention of the
rulemaking process of the sort Ford Motor criticized. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d
1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
238. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at202-03.
239. Another approach to the question of prospective application of agency adjudications
argues that the appropriateness of such prospectivity should turn on the novelty of the legal
principle established. For example, Professor Greene suggested that courts allow agencies to
apply adjudicatory results purely prospectively if the rule established in the adjudication would
be tested under the second prong of the two-part test announced in Chevron USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), for evaluating agency constructions
oftheir authorizing statutes. See Greene, supra note 145, at 278. Under Chevron, courts first ask
whether the statute clearly answers the interpretive question; if not, then courts must defer to any
reasonable agencyconstruction. See Chevron,467 U.S. at 842-45. Thus, ProfessorcGeenewould
allow the agency to apply an adjudication purely prospectively if the rule the adjudication
established was not clearly discernable from the statute; in other words, if the agency was effec-
tively engaging in lawmaking. See Greene, supra note 145, at 276. This Article's analysis is not
inconsistent with Professor Greene's. However, by focusing less on the novelty of the agency's
rule and more on the character ofthe process that produced it, this Article's analysis moves beyond
the concern with unfair retroactivity to address a broader concern about the fimctional appropri-
ateness of an agency choosing adjudication over rulemaking in a particular situation.
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ation of the fact-specific nature of an agency adjudication if an agency at-
tempted to give only prospective effect to what really was a general rule. 4°
But the judicial scrutiny here would be of lesser scope. Courts would not
directly second-guess the agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion. Instead, at most they would decide that an agency could not use adjudi-
cation to apply purely prospectively a rule so unprecedented 241 and so burden-
some that its retroactive application would deny due process. Furthermore,
the only ground for such a judicial decision would be that the agency was
using adjudication even though the rule did not turn on facts specific to the
defendant and even though the agency was not using adjudication in order to
test out a new policy before applying it generally. In other words, the only
situation in which a court should reverse the agency action would be when the
agency was using adjudication to announce a (1) new, (2) purely prospective,
(3) non fact-dependent rule that (4) would be immediately applicable to all
members of the relevant industry and (5) whose retroactive application would
violate due process. If there is to be any judicial role in policing the rule-
making/adjudication distinction, it must include striking down that kind of an
adjudication.
D. Conclusion
This investigation suggests that although the non-fact specificity of the
rule is relevant to the wisdom of an agency decision to act via adjudication or
rulemaking, courts should not use a lack of specificity as the sole criterion for
reviewing the legality of an agency's action. As noted in the discussion of
First Bancorporation, use of adjudication when the litigant's own facts are
not relevant does not violate anyone's constitutional rights aside from the
retroactivity issue." Moreover, courts themselves use adjudications as
vehicles for deciding larger issues without special reference to the litigant's
particular facts. Finally, the agency may well improve its decisions on larger
policy issues if it has in front of it the facts of a particular party, even if the
policy ultimately chosen applies generally to all similarly-situated parties.
Instead, a court's main concern should be the unfairness of retroactive
application. But the Box 4 situation, featuring a fact-specific situation and a
change in the agency's legal position, suggests that allowing the agency to
apply the rule purely prospectively can mitigate the retroactivity problem.
240. See supra note 237 (explaining potential dangers of agency circumvention of rule-
making process).
241. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 549 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part) (discussing "unprecedented" nature of law that should be inval-
idated as unfairly retroactive).
242. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing retroactivity problem inFirstBancorporation).
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Here, prospectivity may cause additional problems because it is inconsistent
with the idea of adjudication as the passing ofjudgment on historical actions.
But in Box 4 the concerns with pure adjudicative prospectivity are lessened
because the fact-specificity (and thus the lack of automatic applicability of the
rule to other parties) limits the scope of the agency action and thus makes it
more akin to adjudication. Just as reliance on facts limits a common-law
decision, so too does it limit a Box 4 decision. This limitation on the scope
of the agency's action also serves to protect the participation rights of non-
parties because they retain a realistic right to challenge the application ofthat
rule to themselves on the grounds that their facts are distinguishable from
those of the litigant in the earlier adjudication. The rule proposed above does
require some investigation into the fact-specificity of the agency's action, but
this investigation is different from the investigation performed in First
Bancorporation. Specifically, the investigation entailed in this proposal is far
more limited in scope and is performed in a context of potentially allowing
agencies to do what courts had not allowed them to do in the past (i.e., adjudi-
cate prospectively). By contrast, FirstBancorporation's analysis spoke to the
agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication,243 a choice that the
Supreme Court has conferred on the agency's discretion.2"
VI The Anti-Circumvention Principle
The previous part of this Article suggested a limited role for courts in
policing an agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication. This part
adds to that discussion the Ninth Circuit's anti-circumvention rule and consid-
ers whether any further judicial role is warranted.
A. Circumvention of the Rulemaking Process
Ninth Circuit cases have defined "circumvention' as the de facto amend-
ing of a recently-adopted regulation245 or as the bypassing of a pending rule-
making.246 The Ninth Circuit has found violations of this "anti-circumven-
tion" principle in two early cases only, FordMotor and Patel." In Patel, the
court struck down an agency's attempt to impose a particular requirement on
a visa applicant when that requirement had been considered, but then elimi-
243. See First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434, 437-38 (10th Cir.
1984) (finding abuse of discretion where agency "improperly attempt[ed] to propose legislative
policy by an adjudicative order").
244. See NLRB v. BellAerorpace Co., 416 U.S. 267,294 (1974) (asserting that "the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [agency's] discretion").
245. See Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39,45-46 (9th Cir. 1978).
246. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008,1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
247. See id.; Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199(9th Cir. 1980).
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nated, from a then-recently promulgated regulation.24 According to the Patel
court, the agency circumvented the rulemaking process when it interpreted the
regulation to include the requirement it had explicitly dropped from the regu-
lation's text.2
49
The Ford Motor court found circumvention in a slightly different con-
text. It noted that the agency had conducted the challenged adjudication while
it was conducting a rulemaking on the same issue." The court did not
explicitly express concern over the bare fact that the agency was conducting
an adjudication while the rulemaking was pending. Obviously, a flat prohibi-
tion on adjudications during a related rulemaking would severely hamstring
the agency's ability to deal with problems that arose during the rulemaking
process. Given how long that process can be, 1 such a flat prohibition would
be severe indeed, and might even have the perverse effect of dissuading the
agency from commencing rulemakings. Instead, the problem was that the
adjudication imposed a new legal requirement which was at the same time at
issue in the rulemaking. Thus, the result in Ford Motor was not that an
agency would have to suspend all adjudications during the pendency of a
related rulemaking; rather, it could not impose during that period any new rule
on a topic that was the subject of a pending rulemaldng. s2 Thus, FordMotor
can be seen as extending Patel's holding against an agency incorporating
through adjudication a principle that had been dropped from a recently-
completed rulemaking also to prohibit such incorporation during a pending
rulemaking on a similar topic. Later Ninth Circuit cases have not expanded
the anti-circumvention test beyond these two circumstances.
Ford Motor and Patel express related concerns with an agency turning
its back on rulemaking. While Patel concerned an agency implicitly repudiat-
ing the results of its own rulemaking process, Ford Motor concerned an
agency ignoring the rulemaking process itself, specifically its own determina-
tion that policy could be best set via a general regulation. 3 Both applications
248. See Patel, 638 F.2d at 1204.
249. The Patel court also found a parallel to NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969). In Patel, the INS relied on a previous adjudication, In re Heitland, as support for its
imposition of the extra visa requirement. Patel, 638 F.2d at 1202-03. Like Excelsior, however,
the Heitland rule was pure dicta: Heitland decided a case under previous regulations and
simply stated that would repeat its imposition of this extra visa requirement in future cases
dealing with the then-newly promulgated rules. See id. at 1202; see also supra notes 245-48
and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases defining "circumvention" of rulemaking
process).
250. See FordMotor, 673 F.2d at 1010.
251. See supra note 170 (explaining potential delays in administrative processes).
252. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
253. Compare Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that agency
considered and rejected requirement during rulemaking) with FordMotor, 673 F.2d at 1010
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of the principle, however, assume that agencies make the initial determination
of the subject's amenability to rulemaking. The anti-circumvention principle
therefore accords a great deal of deference to the agency. Ultimately, the
court is not restricting the agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion. Instead, the rule only forces the agency to live with the consequences of
its choice. Thus, under Ford Motor, if the agency chooses to impose a re-
quirement by the notice and comment process, the agency cannot short-circuit
the notice and comment testing by imposing the requirement in a pending
adjudication. Patel closes the circle: As the proposed extra visa requirement
ultimately failed the notice and comment testing, the INS could not reimpose
it via an adjudication. 4
So understood, the circumvention test resembles judicial attempts to
determine when an agency action comes within the general policy or interpre-
tive rule exemption to the notice and comment requirements of Section 553
of the APA." In many of those cases, courts have recognized the difficulty
of distinguishing when an agency has promulgated a substantive rule from
when it has merely interpreted a rule or announced general guidelines. Thus,
courts have considered, as part of their analyses of the issue, the agency's own
characterization of the statement. 6 Reliance on the agency's own character-
ization of its statement makes sense: because an interpretive rule or general
policy has no legal binding effect, an agency's argument that a statement is
not a substantive rule means that the agency will be forced to litigate the
appropriateness of that guideline or policy every time it initiates an adjudica-
tion. 7 Because description of a statement as something less than a substan-
tive rule thus has real costs for the agency, there is at least some reason for a
court to defer to an agency-imposed label."5
(recognizing that pending rulemaking and adjudication sought to remedy same problem but
criticizing agency's rule).
254. See Patel, 638 F.2d at 1204.
255. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1994) (setting forth exemptions to notice and comment
requirement).
256. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that agency's characterization of its own action is factor to be considered);
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533,539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The real dividing
point between regulations and general statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33,39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
257. See, e.g.,Paciic Gas, 506 F.2d at 38-39.
258. Of course, describing its actions as simply policy statements instead of as binding
regulations also results in real benefits to the agency. For example, a policy statement does not
have to go through the notice and comment process although it may immediately affect private
parties, who may conform their conduct to the agency's policy in order to avoid litigation and/or
sanctions. For a more general discussion of agencies' use of informal means to coerce private
parties to change their conduct, see Noah, supra note 190.
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There is a similar "good news and bad news" quality to the anti-circum-
vention rule. The notice and comment process carries real benefits for the
agency: Not only are the procedural requirements less onerous than those in
any given adjudication against an alleged statutory violator, 9 but the promul-
gation ofthe rule affects every party in the industry and thus achieves a whole-
sale effect that considerably lessens the agency's enforcement burdens.2"c On
the other hand, starting down the rulemaking road also carries costs for the
agency, not the least of which is the loss of flexibility to change the results of
that process. Ofcourse, the agency can always alter or amend a rule; however,
such a change must itself be promulgated pursuant to the notice and comment
process.26' As Chief Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit has noted, "[tio sanction
any other course would render the requirements of § 553 basically superfluous
in legislative rulemaking by permitting agencies to alter their requirements for
affected public members at will through the ingenious device of 'reinterpret-
ing' their own rule.n26
2
The anti-circumvention principle echoes Chief Judge Wald's statement.
Instead of seeking to circumvent the rulemaking process by reinterpreting the
promulgated rule in the abstract, in Patel and Ford Motor the agency at-
tempted to circumvent the process by amending the rule via adjudications
under that rule. 63 In both situations the agency had promulgated a rule and
then was trying to use other means to change the substance of the rule. The
D.C. Circuit rejected the use of wholesale "reinterpretation" to effect that
259. Although the APA itself does not prescribe procedures for informal agency adjudica-
tions, it does for formal, on the record adjudications, and Congress requires those relatively
formal procedures in a variety of contexts. Even in informal adjudications, due process requires
some type of hearing, usually more than the paper hearing required under the APA. See
generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that "when delay in agency proceed-
ings is minimized by using rules, those violating the statutory standard lose an opportunity to
turn litigation into a profitable and lengthy game of postponing the effect of the rule on their
current practice").
260. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d at 690 (discussing "administrative
efficiency" advantage of rulemaking over adjudication).
261. See National Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,
231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994) (authorizing interested private
parties to petition for promulgation, alteration or repeal of any rule).
262. NationalFamily Planning, 979 F.2d at 231-32; see also Homemakers North Shore,
Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408,412 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A volte face... may be an attempt to avoid
the notice and opportunity for comment that the Administrative Procedure Act requires for the
alteration of a rule. When an agency gets out the Dictionary of Newspeak and pronounces that
for purposes of its regulation war is peace, it has made a substantive change for which the APA
may require procedures.").
263. See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text (discussing circumvention in Patel
and Ford Motor).
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change, and the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of retail reinterpretation (via
adjudication) to accomplish that same end.2" At base, the idea is simple: If
the agency wishes to reap the benefits of rulemaking, it must also pay the
costs - here, the costs being those entailed in respecting the integrity of the
rulemaking process.
In essence, then, the Ninth Circuit's anti-circumvention principle seeks
to guard the integrity of the rulemaking process by ensuring that an agency not
be able to manipulate the process once it has embarked on it, but without
interfering with the initial agency decision that the matter is fit for rule-
making. The principle is sound and plays an important role in administrative
law. Still, it does not fully answer the problem of inappropriate agency
decisions to use adjudication as opposed to rulemaking.
B. Beyond Circumvention: Agency Courts and the Nature ofAdjudication
Beyond the anti-circumvention rule, is there any hope for a more general
answer to the puzzle of when courts should force an agency to act via a
rulemaking? Is there a principle that indicates when an issue is inherently
appropriate for either adjudication or rulemaking? To answer this question
it is appropriate to reconsider the attributes of adjudication.
The basic attribute of adjudication is its limited formal scope. This
limitation is reflected in a number of ways, including the imposition of a
standing requirement,26 the limited number of parties affected,2" the nature
of the dispositive facts as "adjudicative" rather than "legislative,"267 and the
incremental, analogical method by which common-law courts decide cases.' 68
264. There may be some difference between these principles. Although the use of
reinterpretation to change the meaning of a rule effectively would change the rule without any
public comment at all, the use of adjudication would at least give the target party the right to
contest the new rule's new content However, this difference is more apparent than real. Even
when the agency attempts to "reinterpret" the regulation, that "reinterpretation" would not itself
be law. Instead, it would be challengeable in court in the course of an adjudication. The fact
that the situation in National Family Planning eventually would become a situation procedur-
ally analogous to Patel or Ford Motor indicates the tight fit of the analogy.
265. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,216-227 (1974)
(finding no Article MI jurisdiction to hear claim when all Americans shared plaintiffs' injuries
in equal fashion).
266. See id. (holding that grievances held by public as whole cannot form basis for Article
III standing).
267. See United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1118 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that choice to engage in rulemaking may have crossed "well established" line between
"'legislative' facts - the kind that can be found reliably without an evidentiary hearing - and
'adjudicative' facts, which cannot be" (citations omitted)); supra note 204 (distinguishing
between adjudication and legislation).
268. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Of course, not all judicial action includes all of these features. For exmple,
some state courts are authorized to issue advisory opinions, thus obviating the
need for an injured party presenting a concrete case or controversy.269 Consti-
tutional and statutory interpretation adjudication often has implications far
beyond the positions of the individual parties to the case. And a court's
interpretation of a statute may well not turn on the facts of the particular
litigant, and the interpretive exercise may well not have much in common with
classic common-law reasoning.7 Nevertheless, these characteristics reflect
the generally limited nature of adjudication. That limited nature not only
distinguishes adjudication from legislation but also protects the rights of non-
parties to the adjudication by ensuring that they have a realistic day in court
when their turn comes, on the theory that the issue will not have been pre-
judged.271 Thus, the search for a limit on agency discretion to act via adjudi-
cation must focus on these principles.
It is clear, however, that agencies generally have the power to use adjudi-
cations as vehicles for changing the law. Chenery itself vindicated this power,
which courts have reiterated consistently since.272 Any search for a principle
limiting agency power to proceed by adjudication must be consistent with this
fundamental principle of administrative law. One problem this power causes
is the possibility of unfair retroactivity. Beyond the Chenery balancing test,
this Article has suggested that agencies be allowed to impose some
adjudicative results - namely, those growing out of fact-intensive contexts -
purely prospectively. But this solution resolves only a minor issue: dealing
with a situation - fact-intensive cases - where agency adjudication is already
fundamentally analogous to judicial action. The harder situation arises when
an agency uses adjudication to announce a generally applicable change in the
law, with the change not depending in any direct sense on the facts presented
by the private party unlucky enough to be chosen as the vehicle for change.
In that situation, assuming no retroactivity problem, the discretion agencies
enjoy, combined with the more "legislative" aspects of agency adjudication,
269. See supra note 63.
270. For example, a textualist might argue that the interpretive task begins and ends with
the plain meaning of the statute.
271. The APA recognizes the difference between rulemaking and adjudications when
determining the requirements of a fair hearing. For example, the rules for determining when
the agency decision-maker has an open mind are stricter - i.e., tougher on the agency - in the
case of adjudications than of rulemakings. See Association of Natal Advertisers v. FTC, 627
F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying more deferential standard to prejudgment claims
made in context of rulemakings than to similar claims made in context of adjudications).
272. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (reiterating that
agency "is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding");
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969) (recognizing utility of adjudications
in agency policymaking).
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makes it difficult to conceive of judicially enforceable limits upon the
agency's choice.
Ultimately, it may be that agency adjudication is different from its judicial
cousin simply because agencies are fundamentally different from courts. Most
notably, agencies are explicitly charged with making law, unchained by the
incremental, analogical reasoning method employed by courts. Instead,
agencies are restrained only by the limits found in the governing statute. Given
the moribund state of the non-delegation doctrine 3 and Congress's tendency
to "solve" difficult issues by transferring the hard choices to an agency, 4 those
limits do not impose much of a restriction on agency power.
This power is fundamentally incompatible with the limits traditionally
associated with adjudication. Agency lawmaking does not require analogical
reasoning based on precedent. At most, it requires substantive rationality
and fidelity to the (normally broad) statutory parameters. The agency law
making process requires statutory and policy analysis, but not consistency
with prior agency pronouncements as long as the agency explains why it has
changed its mind."' These characteristics of the agency's task are incompati-
ble with the limits imposed by legal reasoning and fact-boundedness. At base,
the explicit power to make law is what separates agencies from courts and
makes agency adjudication fundamentally different from adjudication as
classically understood. In turn, this difference makes it difficult to go beyond
the modest judicial role endorsed in this Article for reviewing an agency's
choice of adjudication. That role ultimately protects only two interests:
private party rights to be free of unfair retroactivity and internally inconsistent
agency action. Although these interests are quite fundamental, their protec-
tion leaves the agency broad discretion to choose the method by which to
proceed.
273. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the non-delegation doctrine. See, e.g.,
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1034-40 (D.C. Cir.) (concluding thatEPA's
interpretation of provision of Clean Air Act would violate non-delegation doctrine), reh'g
grantedinpar4 reh 'g denied in part, 195 F3d4 (D.C. Cir. 1999); City ofNew Yorkv. Clinton,
985 F. Supp. 168, 181 (D. D.C.) (invalidating line item veto on non-delegation grounds), aff'd
on other grounds, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). But until these isolated invocations of the doctrine are
expanded upon, it remains fair to consider the doctrine as still dormant See ERWIN CH-EMR-
INSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINcIP.,s AND PolCIES 236-42 (1997) (discussing demise of
non-delegation doctrine).
274. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decifions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 82-85 (1985).
275. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42 (1983) (recognizing agency's "ample latitude" to change its policy in face of changing cir-
cumstances). However, note that such changes will face potentially significant judicial scrutiny.
See id. at 41-42 (noting adherence to presumption that existing rule will best carry out Con-
gress's regulatory policies).
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VT!. Conclusion
This conclusion brings us back to our starting point. In labeling some
agency actions "adjudications" we may have succeeded only in confusing
ourselves by suggesting that there is a fundamental identity between what
courts do and what agency "adjudicators" do. There are, of course, significant
parallels. Most importantly, both agency courts and judicial courts formally act
against particular, identified parties. In turn, that action calls into operationthe
procedural guarantees we have come to identify with judicial action, such as the
right to a hearing presided over by an impartial adjudicator with an open mind.
But the differences between agency and judicial adjudicators are even
more fundamental than these similarities. Courts normally are thought to play
a very different role m government than the legislature, even when courts for
all intents and purposes make generally applicable law. But Congress explic-
itly charges agencies with a task - lawmaking - that makes them the functional
equivalent of legislatures. To limit the agency's ability to carry out that funda-
mental task on the ground that the means chosen to accomplish it are more
appropriate to law applying than to lawmaking threatens to cripple the agency's
ability to use its discretion as to how best to carry out its legislative mandate.
Unless the agency's choice violates a constitutional guarantee (i.e., the fair
notice requirement of the non-retroactivity principle), or unless the agency's
choice reflects an internal inconsistency m how the agency uses that discretion
(i.e., if it tries to circumvent its own decision that rulemakmg is the appropri-
ate modality), the choice between "adjudication" and "rulemaking" must be
left with the agency This is notto saythatthe agency is free to act as a legis-
lature when it wishes and as a court when it wishes. It is, mstead, to say that,
fundamentally, the agency is neither a legislature nor a court but a separate
creature entirely This conclusion reaffirms the accuracy of Justice Jackson's
observation nearly a half-century ago that the rise of administrative agencies
"has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth
dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinkng."' 6 It may be time for
courts considering this issue to recogmze agencies' hybrid nature, and to
abandon the attempt to superimpose traditional conceptions of legislation onto
agency rulemakmg, and traditional conceptions ofjudicial action onto agency
adjudication.
276. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
